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We consider two risk-averse financial agents who negotiate the price of
an illiquid indivisible contingent claim in an incomplete semimartingale market
environment. Under the assumption that the agents are exponential utility
maximizers with non-traded random endowments, we provide necessary and
sufficient conditions for the negotiation to be successful, i.e., for the trade to
occur. We, also, study the asymptotic case where the size of the claim is small
compared to the random endowments and give a full characterization in this
case. We, then, study a partial-equilibrium problem for a bundle of divisible
claims and establish its existence and uniqueness. A number of technical
results on conditional indifference prices are provided. Finally, we generalize
the notion of partial-equilibrium pricing in the case where the agents’ risk
preferences are modelled by convex capital requirements.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In an ideal complete market, each contingent claim payoff can be per-
fectly replicated by dynamic trading in the market assets. Thus, any rational
financial agent is indifferent between the (random) claim itself and its (de-
terministic) replication price (i.e., its unique arbitrage-free price). Abundant
empirical evidence, however, shows that the real financial markets are far from
complete; only a small portion of contingent claims payoffs can be replicated
in the market to a satisfactory degree and some unavoidable risk is present.
A non-specific abstract notion of rationality is no longer sufficient to single
out a unique “fair price” of any contingent claim. Instead, any agent’s valua-
tion and hedging strategy for non-replicable claims should depend on her risk
preferences and her current investment positions.
The fact that there is no single arbitrage-free price for any non-replicable
claim can be exhibited in the over-the-counter transactions where, typically,
two agents negotiate the price of a single, indivisible, non-replicable, contin-
gent claim. The final outcome of such a negotiation eventually hinges upon
three idiosyncratic factors; the agents’ attitudes towards risk, their initial ran-
dom endowments and their negotiation skills. This thesis focuses on the first
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two. In particular we ask the following question:
Under what conditions on the claim whose price is being negotiated, the
liquid-market environment and the agents’ risk attitudes will a mutually
beneficial agreement be feasible?
In the fist part of this text (Chapters 2-4), whose main source is [4],
we model agents’ risk preferences by assuming that agents are expected utility
function maximizers in the von Neumann-Morgenstern sense, with a common
investment horizon T > 0. For simplicity and analytic tractability we suppose
that both agents’ utility functions are exponential, possibly with different risk-
aversion parameters. In the second part (Chapter 5), we assume that agents’
risk measurements, and hence their contingent claim valuations, are obtained
using the general notion of a convex risk measure (also called convex capital
requirement). Roughly speaking, a convex risk measure (defined in [36]; see
also a short survey in the Appendix B), is a map from the set of possible
investment payoffs to the real line, whose aim is to quantify the risk involved
to any payoff.
Another important feature in our setting, which is not present in a ma-
jor part of the past work on the subject, are the agents’ random endowments .
The agents are assumed to hold a portfolio -their initial risk exposure- and
the risk assessment of any contingent claim will depend heavily upon its (co-)
relation with this portfolio. Generally, we use the term random endowment to
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refer to the discounted accumulated wealth of all investments with maturity
up to time T , undertaken by an agent at the initial time t = 0.
In addition to the illiquid random endowments, both agents have access
to a liquid incomplete financial market modelled by a general locally-bounded
semimartingale. As in the case of the random endowment, we assume that the
prices of the market assets and all payoffs are already discounted; this means
that we can freely compare values corresponding to different points in time.
As a discount factor, we use a fixed traded asset, usually called the nume´raire
security .
Mathematical-finance literature abounds with information on the utility-
maximization problem for a variety of utility concepts (see, for instance, [24],
[54], [55], [58], [65], [66], [70], [77]). In locally-bounded semimartingale market
models the problem of utility maximization and in particular the necessary
and sufficient conditions for the existence of an optimal trading strategy for
utility functions defined on positive real line have been established in [58] and
further analyzed under the presence of random endowment in [24] and in [49].
The corresponding studies for utilities defined on the whole real line have been
given in [70], and in [65] under random endowment. The special case of an
exponential utility function in semimartingale markets has been extensively
analyzed in [29], [53], [57] and [62].
Given the utility maximization problem, the notion of an acceptable
investment is quite natural. An investment position is called acceptable if
the addition of its payoff to the agent’s random endowment results in higher
3
maximized utility. This acceptance criterion induces the notion of utility in-
difference pricing . More precisely, the writer’s (buyer’s) indifference price of a
contingent claim with payoff B is the minimum (maximum) amount of money
v, such that v−B (B− v) is an acceptable investment position. Equivalently,
the indifference price is the amount of money that makes an agent indiffer-
ent - in the sense of utility maximization - between selling (buying) the claim
at price v and foregoing the transaction. This scenario induces a subjective
pricing mechanism for each agent according to which she states her ask and
bid prices for each contingent claim. The idea of indifference pricing under
the utility maximization scheme was introduced in the mathematical finance
literature in [47] and then extensively developed in a variety of directions. In
mathematical terms, the problem of utility indifference pricing is similar to
the study of utility maximization under random endowment, in the sense that
one can always think of a claim payoff as (additional) random endowment (see
among others [29], [47], [49], [57] and [66]).
If the presence of illiquid random endowment in agent’s portfolio is
assumed, we call the indifference price conditional (also called relative indif-
ference price in [64] and [73]) to indicate the strong dependence of the price on
the random endowment. In the exponential world, some of its properties can
be obtained by a simple change of measure which, effectively, removes the con-
ditionality. Other properties, however, cannot be dealt with in that manner.
In Chapter 2, we establish certain properties of conditional indifference prices
in a general semimartingale market setting. We show, for instance, a rather
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unexpected fact that conditional indifference prices (unlike their unconditional
versions) do not have to be monotone in the risk-aversion parameter.
Under the conditions described above, the two agents meet at time 0
when one of the agents (the seller) offers a contingent claim with time-T payoff
B to the other one (the buyer) in exchange for a lump-sum payment p at time
t = 0. Our central question, posed above, can now be made more precise and
split into two separate components:
1. Is there a number p ∈ R such that the exchange of the contingent claim
B for a lump sum p is (strictly) acceptable for both agents?
2. If more than one such p exists, can we determine the exact outcome of
the negotiation?
In the case when the answer to question 1. is positive, we say that the agents
are in agreement. In Chapter 3, we give a fairly complete answer to question 1.,
in terms of random endowments, while we only touch upon the issues involved
in question 2. In fact, it is not possible to give a definitive answer to this
question without a precise model of the negotiation process (see, for instance,
[12] for an overview on modelling background and [3] for a proposed scenario).
A partial answer is possible, however, when the indivisibility assumption is
dropped (see Chapter 4).
It is, perhaps, surprising that unless non-replicable random endowments
are present, no contingent claims will lead to agreement, even for agents with
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very different risk-aversion coefficients. When the random endowments are
indeed present, we give a necessary and sufficient condition for the set of
mutually agreeable claims to be larger that the set of replicable ones. This
characterization is closely related to the notion of optimal risk sharing, which
was first studied in the context of insurance/reinsurance negotiation (see, for
instance, [14], [17] and [26]) and in terms of the principal’s problem (see, for
instance, [48]) and recently developed in more general settings (see , [9], [10],
[35], [37] and [52]).
An affirmative answer to the question 1. leads to the following problem:
is there a criterion for an agreement about a given claim B? We propose two
approaches: one through the notion of residual risk and the other based on
asymptotic approximation of conditional indifference prices for small quanti-
ties.
The residual risk (introduced in [63]) of a random liability is defined as
the difference between the liability’s payoff and the terminal value of the opti-
mal risk-monitoring strategy at maturity. We establish the following criterion,
made precise in the body of the text (see Section 3.4): a claim is mutually
agreeable if and only if it reduces the expected sum of the agents’ residual
risks under some equivalent martingale measure.
The other approach provides an explicit criterion in the asymptotic case
when the size of the contingent claim B is small compared to the size of the
agents’ random endowments. It is possible to phrase the agreement problem
in terms of a relationship between the buyer’s and the seller’s conditional in-
6
difference price for the claim, so it is not unusual that an asymptotic study of
these quantities plays a major role. More precisely, we provide a rather general
Taylor-type approximation of the conditional exponential indifference price for
locally bounded semimartingales on continuous filtrations. These approxima-
tions are then used to give simple asymptotic criteria for agreeability, as well
as the asymptotic size of the interval of mutually-agreeable prices. Since it is
not possible to obtain closed-form representations of indifference prices in gen-
eral market models, such asymptotic results can be very useful even beyond
the agreement problem.
Asymptotic techniques are not new in utility maximization problems.
Results on the second order approximation of the indifference price for the ex-
ponential and the power utility, in a market with Brownian motion dynamics,
are given in [44] (see also [46]). These results are generalized in [59] for semi-
martingale markets and general utility functions defined on the positive real
line. However, the arguments presented there do not cover the case of the ex-
ponential utility (e.g., the situation when the optimal wealth is not necessarily
bounded from below by zero). For the exponential utility in a semimartingale
market, the first derivative of the indifference price for a vector of claims is
given in [51]. By imposing the assumption of continuity on the filtration, we
generalize their result (as well as the asymptotic approximation in [72]) by
providing a second order approximation of the price for a vector of claims.
In the case where the agents are allowed to negotiate not only the price
of the claim, but also the number of units traded, the classic market clearing
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conditions can be used to compute these two quantities. More precisely, for a
given vector of claims, we define the utility-based demand function for both
agents. Roughly speaking, the demand function at a price p is the number
of units of the given vector of claims that the agent is willing to buy at price
p, where “willing” refers to the utility maximization criterion. Then we call
a price p, partial equilibrium price if the sum of demand functions at p is
zero. Furthermore, the (vector) quantity of the claims that is to be traded
between the agents at equilibrium price p is called partial equilibrium quan-
tity. In Chapter 4, we state the precise definition and we prove existence and
uniqueness, as well as a formula of the partial equilibrium price.
The existence results of various types of competitive equilibria are a
staple of quantitative economics literature, and have recently made their way
into mathematical finance (see, among others, [18], [25], [34], [43] and [78]).
The incomplete partial-equilibrium setting presented herein, however, new and
not covered by any of the existing results. As we already mentioned above,
it is only in the present setting that we can say something about question 2.,
i.e., about the realized price p of the offered contingent claim B.
In Chapter 5, we assume that the agents’ attitudes towards risk are
modelled by convex capital requirements which can be understood as a gener-
alization of the acceptance criterion induced by the utility maximization. The
notion of capital requirement or risk measure was introduced in mathematical
finance literature in late nineties and since then it has captured a large part
of the research activity in this field. For a short introduction to this field and
8
a list of related references we refer the reader to Appendix B.
In our general semimartingale financial market, we fix a time horizon
T > 0 and we endow each agent with an acceptance set, i.e., the set of all
investment positions with maturity T that the agent is willing to undertake
at time 0. These acceptance sets incorporate agents’ risk preferences and
satisfy certain rationality properties such as monotonicity and convexity. In
the same fashion as in the case of indifference pricing, each agent’s acceptance
set induces a subjective pricing mechanism called convex risk measure. Having
introduced these new concepts, we suppose the existence of I ≥ 2 agents with
common time horizon T , who wish to trade a vector of contingent claims with
maturity at T . We then generalize the notion of mutually agreeable claims by
considering a vector of claims instead of a single one and by including more
than two agents. A number of properties of the set of agreeable claims are
exhibited.
The notions of demand function and partial equilibrium pricing are
similarly generalized in this setting: given a vector of claims, each agent’s
demand function maps price vectors to the units of claims that minimize the
risk measure of the corresponding position. Then, the partial equilibrium price
is the price vector at which the sum of agents’ demand functions is zero and the
partial equilibrium allocation is the corresponding allocation. We use the term
“allocation” in this setting instead of “quantity” to emphasize the possibility
of the participation of more than two agents. In Chapter 5, we impose the
necessary assumptions which lead to an existence and uniqueness result and
9
we discuss these findings.
The chapters are organized in the following way: In Chapter 2, we
first describe the market model and introduce necessary notation and we state
some properties of the conditional indifference prices, together with some new
results on their unconditional versions. We also include the second order ap-
proximation of the conditional price. The notion of agreement is introduced
and analyzed in Chapter 3, where its connection with the agents’ residual risk
and the price approximation is also discussed. The topics of Chapter 4 are the
definition, the existence and the uniqueness of the partial equilibrium price-
quantity for a vector of contingent claims. The generalized notions of agents’
agreement and partial equilibrium price-allocation are introduced and devel-
oped in Chapter 5, where the corresponding result of existence and uniqueness
is proven. In Appendix A, we state the definition and the main properties of
the dynamic version of the conditional indifference prices. Separate sections
are devoted to the residual risk process and the definition of the class of mar-
tingale, called BMO-martingales. Finally, in Appendix B, we present a short
review of the theory of convex risk measures, where we focus on the definitions
and results mentioned in Chapter 5.
To facilitate the exposition, we list the notation and the keywords men-
tioned throughout the text in the Index.
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Chapter 2
Utility Conditional Indifference Prices
This chapter is dedicated to the description of the market model and
the study of the conditional indifference price. Throughout the text, we adopt
the general framework of a locally-bounded semimartingale market (see [31]
for a detailed overview) and the exponential utility set up of [29] and [62].
In Section 2.1, we include the necessary notation, describe the utility
maximization problem and recall some well-known related results. The natu-
rally raised feature of the utility-based acceptance set is, then, introduced and
a number of its properties are proven.
The main object of Section 2.2 is the conditional indifference price.
As mentioned in the Introduction, the utility indifference price of a contin-
gent claim B is the price that makes a utility maximizer indifferent between
selling/buying the claim and omitting the transaction. The large majority
of the existed literature on this field does not include the case where the
agent has a random endowment in her portfolio. If a random endowment is
present in agent’s portfolio, the indifference price is called conditional. Results
on this notion are presented in Section 2.2, where their differences with the
corresponding results on the unconditional version are highlighted. For this
11
analysis, we use an equivalence relation between payoffs; two random payoffs
are equivalent (with respect to risk) if their difference is a replicable claim.
The part of the unhedgeable risk left to agent’s portfolio after under-
taking any non-replicable investment is usually called residual risk. In Section
2.3, we state its definition and we provide straightforward results in its writer’s
and buyer’s indifference price.
Finally, in Section 2.4, under the assumption of continuous filtrations,
we compute the second derivative of the conditional indifference price in the
units of the claims. Then, we use this result to provide a rather general second
order approximation of the price of a vector of contingent claims.
2.1 Market Model and Preliminary Results
In this section, we introduce the model of investment and the agents’
characteristics, that is, their utility functions, random endowments, admissible
strategies and indifference prices. A number of notations used in the following
chapters is, also, introduced.
2.1.1 The traded assets and the agents
The financial market model is based on a filtered probability space
(Ω,F,F,P), F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ], T > 0, which satisfies the “usual conditions”
of right-continuity and augmentation by P−negligible sets. There are d + 1
traded assets (d ∈ N), whose discounted price processes are modelled by
an Rd+1−valued locally bounded semimartingale process (S(0)t ; St)t∈[0,T ] =
12
(S
(0)
t ;S
(1)
t , . . . , S
(d)
t )t∈[0,T ]. The first asset, S
(0)
t , plays the role of a nume´raire
security or a discount factor. Operationally, we simply set S
(0)
t ≡ 1, for all
t ∈ [0, T ], P−a.s..
We place ourselves in the von Neumann-Morgenstern framework (see
[75]) and we assume that each market participant evaluates the risk of an
uncertain position X at time T according to the expected utility EP[U(X+E)],
where U is a utility function, E is the random endowment (accumulated illiquid
wealth) and P is the subjective probability measure. For technical reasons, we
restrict our attention to E ∈ L∞ (where L∞ stands for the set L∞(Ω,F,P))
and the class of exponential utilities
U(x) = − exp(−γx), x ∈ R,
where the constant γ ∈ (0,∞) is the (absolute) risk aversion coefficient.
An agent invests in the market by choosing a portfolio strategy ϑ in
an admissibility class Θ, to be specified below. The resulting gains process
(Xϑt )t∈[0,T ] is the stochastic integral X
ϑ
t = (ϑ ·S)t =
∫ t
0
ϑu dSu. For the choice
of set of admissible strategies, we follow the setup introduced in [62] (see also
[29]).
Before we give a precise description of the aforementioned set Θ, we
need to introduce several concepts related to the no-arbitrage requirement.
We start with the sets Ma and Me of absolutely continuous and equivalent
local martingale measures, i.e.,
Ma = {Q P : S is a local martingale under Q}
13
and
Me = {Q ≈ P : S is a local martingale under Q} .
For a probability measure Q on (Ω,F), we define
H(Q|P) =
{
EP
[
dQ
dP ln
(
dQ
dP
)]
Q P,
+∞ otherwise.
The (extended) positive number H(Q|P) is called the relative entropy of the
probability measure Q with respect to probability measure P. It is well-known
that for every absolutely continuous probability measure Q, H(Q|P) ≥ 0 and
H(Q|P) = 0 if and only if P = Q. Intuitively, the function H(·|P) can be used
to measure how “close” to P a probability measure Q is. For further details
on the notion of relative entropy we refer the interested reader to [42] or [39].
We also set
Me,f = {Q ∈Me : H(Q|P) <∞}
and enforce the following assumption.
Assumption 2.1.1. Me,f 6= ∅.
Assumption 2.1.1 trivially implies that Me 6= ∅ which, in turn, guar-
antees that no arbitrage opportunities exist in the market. In fact, a stronger
statement of “no free lunch with vanishing risk” will also hold, as proved in
[30], Corollary 1.2. The additional requirement in Assumption 2.1.1 is com-
mon in the literature and ensures that the choice of the exponential function
14
for the utility leads to a well-defined behavior for utility-maximizing agents
(see, among others, [39] and [29]).
We remind the reader that L0(F) denotes the set of all (P−a.s. equiva-
lent classes of) F−measurable random variables. In the sequel, the expectation
operator under a probability measure Q is denoted by EQ[·], where the super-
script Q is omitted in the case of the (subjective) measure P. Also, for a
random variable B ∈ L0(F) with E[exp(B)] < ∞, we define the probability
measure PB, through its Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to P by
dPB
dP
=
eB
E[eB]
.
Furthermore, Q(0) denotes the probability measure in Ma with the minimal
relative entropy with respect to P, i.e., the probability measure for which
H(Q(0)|P) ≤ H(Q|P), for all Q ∈Ma. It is a consequence of Assumption 2.1.1
that the probability measureQ(0) exists, is unique and belongs toMe,f (see [39],
Theorem 2.2). Similarly, for every B such that E[exp(B)] < ∞, there exists
a unique probability measure Q(B) ∈ Ma such that H(Q(B)|PB) ≤ H(Q|PB),
for all Q ∈Ma (see [29], page 103).
Having introduced the required families of probability measures, we
turn back to definition of the class Θ of admissible strategies
Θ = {ϑ ∈ L (S) : (ϑ · S) is a Q−martingale, ∀Q ∈Me,f} (2.1.1)
where L(S) is the set of all predictable (d + 1)−dimensional S−integrable
processes on [0, T ]. More information about the set Θ of admissible strategies
is given in [62] (see also remarks on the set Θ2 in [29], page 104).
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A random variable B ∈ L0(F) is said to be replicable if there exists
a constant c and an admissible strategy ϑ ∈ Θ such that B = c + (ϑ · S)T ,
P−a.s.; the set of replicable random variables will be denoted by R0. More
generally, we introduce the following equivalence relation between random vari-
ables in L0(F).
Definition 2.1.2. We call two random variables B,C ∈ L0(F) risk equivalent
or equal up to replicability and write B ∼ C, if the difference B−C is replicable.
It is clear that the relation ∼ is an equivalence relation on L0(F) (since
Θ is a vector space). We note that the zero equivalence class coincides with
the set R0 of the replicable random variables. For future reference, we let
R∞ = R0 ∩ L∞ denote the set of all (essentially) bounded replicable random
variables.
2.1.2 Utility maximization and indifference pricing
Given their risk profiles, financial agents trade in the financial market
with the goal of maximizing their expected utility. More precisely, an agent
with initial wealth x ∈ R, risk-aversion coefficient γ and random endowment
E ∈ L∞ will choose a portfolio process ϑ ∈ Θ so as to maximize the expected
utility E[− exp(−γ(x + (ϑ · S)T + E))]. The value function uγ(x|E) of the
corresponding optimization problem is given by
uγ(x|E) = sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp (−γ(x+ (ϑ · S)T + E)) ], x ∈ R. (2.1.2)
16
Overloading the notation slightly, for any random variable B ∈ L∞ (inter-
preted as a contingent payoff with maturity T ) we define the indirect utility of
B by uγ(B|E) = uγ(0|E+B), i.e.,
uγ(B|E) = sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T + E+B))
]
. (2.1.3)
Remark 2.1.3. It was proved in [29], Theorem 2.2 (see also [53], Theorem
2.1 and Theorem 2.2.4 below) that the maximums in (2.1.2) and (2.1.3) are
attained.
The indirect utility uγ(·|E) induces an acceptance set , denoted byAγ(E).
More precisely, we define
Aγ(E) = {B ∈ L∞ : uγ(0|E) ≤ uγ(B|E)} . (2.1.4)
Intuitively, Aγ(E) contains all the claims with maturity up to T that the agent
with random endowment E and risk aversion γ accepts to undertake at time
t = 0. Similarly, we define the set A◦γ(E) = {B ∈ L∞ : uγ(0|E) < uγ(B|E)},
which is called the agent’s strict acceptance set .
It is a consequence of the choice of the exponential utility function that
the addition of any constant initial wealth x ∈ R to the random endowment E
does not influence the acceptance sets Aγ(E) and A
◦
γ(E). More generally, we
have the following proposition. We remind the reader that a set A is called
monotone if B ≥ C, P−a.s. and C ∈ A imply B ∈ A.
Proposition 2.1.4. For every E ∈ L∞ and γ ∈ (0,∞), the sets Aγ(E) and
A◦γ(E) are convex, monotone and for every E1,E2 ∈ L∞
E1 ∼ E2 implies Aγ(E1) = Aγ(E2) and A◦γ(E1) = A◦γ(E2) (2.1.5)
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Proof. We prove the arguments forAγ(E) since the proof is the same forA
◦
γ(E).
Consider B1, B2 ∈ Aγ(E) and λ ∈ [0, 1]. If ϑ1,ϑ2 ∈ Θ are the maximiz-
ers of (2.1.3) for B = B1 and B = B2 respectively (see Theorem 2.2.4 for the
existence of ϑ1 and ϑ2), the concavity property of the utility function yields
that
uγ(λB1 + (1− λ)B2|E) ≥ E[U(λB1 + (1− λ)B2 + λϑ1 + (1− λ)ϑ2 + E)]
≥ λuγ(B1|E) + (1− λ)uγ(B2|E) ≥ uγ(0|E)
which implies the convexity of Aγ(E).
Let C ∈ L∞ and suppose that B1 ≤ C, P−a.s. Then by the mono-
tonicity of the utility function we have
uγ(C|E) ≥ E[U(C + ϑ1 + E)] ≥ uγ(B1|E) ≥ uγ(0|E)
i.e., C ∈ Aγ(E).
Finally, E1 ∼ E2 means that there exist k ∈ R and ϑˆ ∈ Θ such that
E1 − E2 = k + (ϑˆ · S)T . Hence,
uγ(B|E1) = sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
−γ
(
(ϑ · S)T + E2 + k +
(
ϑˆ · S
)
T
+B
)) ]
= e−γk sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp (−γ ((ϑ · S)T + E2 +B))
]
= e−γkuγ(B|E2),
for every B ∈ L∞. This implies that B ∈ Aγ(E1) if and only if e−γkuγ(B|E2) ≥
e−γkuγ(0|E2), i.e., if and only if B ∈ Aγ(E2).
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The acceptance set Aγ(E) can be used to introduce the notion of a
conditional indifference price. The conditional writer’s indifference price,
ν(w)(B; γ|E) of the contingent claim B ∈ L∞ is defined by
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = inf {p ∈ R : p−B ∈ Aγ(E)} , (2.1.6)
i.e., ν(w)(B; γ|E) is the minimum amount of money at which the agent with
risk aversion coefficient γ and random endowment E is willing to sell a claim
with payoff B.
It follows directly from (2.1.6) that ν(w)(B; γ|E) satisfies the equation
uγ(ν
(w)(B; γ|E)−B|E) = uγ(0|E).
In analogy, the conditional buyer’s indifference price ν(b)(B; γ|E) is de-
fined by
ν(b)(B; γ|E) = sup {p ∈ R : B − p ∈ Aγ(E)} , (2.1.7)
i.e., ν(b)(B; γ|E) is the maximum amount of money at which the agent, with risk
aversion coefficient γ and random endowment E, is willing to buy a contingent
claim with payoff B. Similarly to the writer’s case, ν(b)(B; γ|E) satisfies the
equation
uγ(B − ν(b)(B; γ|E)|E) = uγ(0|E).
In the special case where E ∼ 0, the corresponding prices are called
unconditional indifference prices (or, simply, indifference prices) and denoted
by ν(w) (B; γ) and ν(b) (B; γ).
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The notion of the indifference price has been studied by many authors
(see, among others, [44], [47], [63] and [69]). The definition of the conditional
indifference price under exponential utility was given in [13] for general semi-
martingale model, in [64] for a binomial case model and in [73] for a diffusion
model (where the price is called relative indifference price). A discussion of the
conditional indifference price under general utility functions is given in [66].
2.2 Results on the Conditional Indifference Price
The subject of this section is the conditional indifference price and its
properties. The results stated below are not only very useful for our analysis
on the mutually agreeability and the partial equilibrium, but they may also be
seen as interesting in their own right since they describe some of the aspects
of indifference valuation under the presence of random endowment. Some new
results about the unconditional indifference price (see Lemma 2.2.9, Proposi-
tions 2.2.12, 2.2.13 and 2.2.16), as well as several generalizations of existing
results in the case of the conditional price (see Theorem 2.2.4, Propositions
2.2.7 and 2.2.15) are exhibited.
We start with some basic properties of the indifference prices whose
proof is straightforward from the Definitions 2.1.6 and 2.1.7.
Proposition 2.2.1. For every B,E,E′ ∈ L∞ and γ ∈ (0,∞), it holds that
1. ν(b)(B; γ|E) = −ν(w)(−B; γ|E), for B,E ∈ L∞.
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2. When E ∈ R∞ (in particular, when E is constant) ν(w)(·; γ|E) and ν(b)(·; γ|E)
coincide with their unconditional versions ν(w) (·; γ) and ν(b) (·; γ).
3. More generally, we have ν(w)(·; γ|E) = ν(w)(·; γ|E′) and ν(b)(·; γ|E) =
ν(b)(·; γ|E′) as soon as E ∼ E′.
In the case where E  0, there are two ways to write the conditional
indifference price in terms of an unconditional one. This is shown in the
following proposition.
Proposition 2.2.2. For every B,E ∈ L∞ and γ ∈ (0,∞), the following
statements are true
1. The conditional indifference prices ν(w)(B; γ|E), ν(b)(B; γ|E) can be writ-
ten as the unconditional indifference prices of B, computed under the
probability measure P−γE.
2. Moreover, ν(w)(B; γ|E) = ν(w) (B − E; γ)− ν(w) (−E; γ)
and ν(b)(B; γ|E) = ν(b) (B + E; γ)− ν(b) (E; γ).
Proof. It follows from the definition of the indifference price that ν(w)(B; γ|E)
solves the equation
e−γν
(w)(B;γ|E)uγ(−B|E) = uγ(0|E). (2.2.1)
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We also have that, for every B ∈ L∞,
uγ(−B|E) = sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T + E−B))
]
= sup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
exp(−γE) (− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T −B)))
]
= E[exp(−γE)]sup
ϑ∈Θ
EP−γE
[
(− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T −B)))
]
.
Taking (2.2.1) into account, we get that the indifference price solves
e−γν
(w)(B;γ|E)sup
ϑ∈Θ
EP−γE
[
(− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T −B)))
]
= sup
ϑ∈Θ
EP−γE
[
(− exp(−γ ((ϑ · S)T )))
]
,
which completes the proof of part 1 (the case of the buyer’s price is similar).
For part 2, we refer the reader to [13], page 21.
Below, we state an example of a market model that will be used in the
sequel.
Example 2.2.3. This example is set in an incomplete financial market similar
to the one considered in [63] (see, also, [44]). The market consists of one risky
asset S = (St)t∈[0,T ] with dynamics
dSt = St
(
µ(t) dt+ σ(t) dW
(1)
t
)
,
and an additional (non-traded) factor Y = (Yt)t∈[0,T ], which evolves is a unique
strong solution of
dYt = b(Yt, t) dt+ a(Yt, t)
(
ρdW
(1)
t + ρ
′dW (2)t
)
,
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where W (1) = (W
(1)
t )t∈[0,T ] and W
(2) = (W
(2)
t )t∈[0,T ] are two standard indepen-
dent Brownian Motions, defined on a probability space (Ω,F, (Ft)t∈[0,T ],P).
The constant ρ ∈ (−1, 1) is the correlation coefficient and ρ′ = √1− ρ2.
We assume that the deterministic functions µ, σ : [0, T ] → R are uniformly
bounded (σ > 0).
By Theorem 3 in [63] (in [63] µ and σ are constants, but the arguments
carry over to this setting too), we have that
ν(w) (B; γ) =
1
γ (1− ρ2) ln
{
EQ(0)
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)B
]}
, (2.2.2)
for any payoff B ∈ L∞, such that B = g(YT ) for some bounded Borel function
g : R→ R, where the Radon-Nikodym derivative of Q(0) is given by
dQ(0)
dP
= exp
(
−
∫ T
0
1
2
λ2(t)dt−
∫ T
0
λ(t)dW
(1)
t
)
,
and λ(t) = µ(t)
σ(t)
is the Sharpe ratio of S.
It is a direct consequence of (2.2.2) and of part 2 of Proposition 2.2.2
that, for every random endowment E ∈ L∞ such that E = q(YT ) for some
bounded Borel function q : R→ R, we get that
ν(w) (B; γ|E) = 1
γ (1− ρ2) ln
E
Q(0)
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)(B−E)
]
EQ(0) [e−γ(1−ρ2)E]
 . (2.2.3)
Given Proposition 2.2.2, we can generalize some well-known results on
unconditional indifference prices to include the case of random endowment.
Indeed, first we give the so-called robust representation of the indifference
price, stated in the following Theorem, which is a variation of Theorem 2.2 in
[29] and Theorem 2.1 in [53] (we use the notation L1 for the set L1(Ω,F,P)).
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Theorem 2.2.4. ([29], [53])
For B ∈ L∞, we have
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = sup
Q∈Ma
{
EQ[B]− 1
γ
h−γE(Q)
}
, (2.2.4)
where, for C ∈ L∞, we define the map hC : L1 7→ [0,+∞] as
hC(Q) =
{
H(Q|PC)−H(Q(C)|PC) when Q ∈Ma,
+∞ otherwise.
The supremum in (2.2.4) is uniquely attained by the measure Q(−γE+γB), which
belongs in Me,f and its Radon-Nikodym derivative with respect to P−γE+γB can
be written as
dQ(−γE+γB)
dP−γE+γB
= ke(−γϑ
(−γE+γB)·S)T , (2.2.5)
where ϑ(−γE+γB) ∈ Θ is the maximizer of the control problem associated with
the value function uγ(−B|E) and k ∈ R is the normalization constant.
Corollary 2.2.5. The mappings B 7→ ν(w)(B; γ|E) and B 7→ ν(b)(B; γ|E)
are, respectively, lower and upper semi-continuous with respect to the weak-*
topology σ(L∞,L1).
Proof. It suffices to note that (2.2.4) represents ν(w)(·; γ|E) as a supremum of
σ(L∞,L1)−continuous and linear functionals on L∞.
Another direct consequence of the representation formula (2.2.4) is the
following proposition.
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Proposition 2.2.6. The mappings B 7→ ν(w)(−B; γ|E) and B 7→ −ν(b)(B; γ|E)
are convex, decreasing and replication invariant, that is
ν(w)(B + (ϑ · S)T ; γ|E) = ν(w)(B; γ|E), for all ϑ ∈ Θ.
The function h−γE(·) in Theorem 2.2.4 is sometimes called the penalty
function for the indifference price ν(w)(·; γ|E), and is convex. It is in fact
strictly convex on its effective domain Me,f ; we remind the reader that the
effective domain of a convex function f is the subset of its domain for which
f < +∞. It is well-known (see, e.g., [37], Lemma 3.29) that the conjugate
representation,
E[X logX] = sup
Y ∈L∞
(
E[Y X]− logE[eY ]) ,
where we use the convention that x log(x) = +∞, for x < 0, is valid for all
X ∈ L1+, such that E[X] = 1. Using this representation and the natural iden-
tification of finite measures equivalent to P with their Radon-Nikodym deriva-
tives in L1, we can readily establish the following properties of the penalty
function h.
Proposition 2.2.7. For C ∈ L∞, the function hC : L1 7→ [0,+∞] is convex
(strictly on its effective domain) and σ(L1,L∞)−lower semicontinuous.
An immediate corollary of Proposition 2.2.7 and the Hahn-Banach The-
orem in the separation form (see [37] for details on convex analysis and also
[52], Theorem 2.1) is the following result.
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Proposition 2.2.8. The mapping h−γE is the minimal penalty function for
ν(w)(·; γ|E), i.e.,
h−γE(Q) ≤ h˜(Q), for all Q ∈Ma,
whenever the function h˜ satisfies
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B]− 1
γ
h˜(Q)
)
, for all B ∈ L∞.
Moreover, the dual, conjugate representation
1
γ
h−γE(Q) = sup
B∈L∞
(
EQ[B]− ν(w)(B; γ|E)) , ∀Q ∈ L1
holds.
2.2.1 Conditional indifference prices and risk equivalence classes
Using the linearity of the set Θ of the admissible trading strategies and
the properties of the exponential utility, one can deduce that the following
scaling property holds true
αν(w) (B;αγ) = ν(w) (αB; γ) , for B ∈ L∞, γ, α > 0. (2.2.6)
The following Lemma states that the indifference price has a certain subaddi-
tive property, with true additivity holding only in exceptional cases.
Lemma 2.2.9. For B1, B2 ∈ L∞ and γ1, γ2 > 0, let γ˜ > 0 be given by
1
γ˜
=
1
γ1
+
1
γ2
.
Then,
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(a) ν(w) (B1; γ1) + ν
(w) (B2; γ2) ≥ ν(w) (B1 +B2; γ˜), and
(b) the following two conditions are equivalent
(1) ν(w) (B1; γ1) + ν
(w) (B2; γ2) = ν
(w) (B1 +B2; γ˜),
(2) γ1
γ˜
B1 ∼ γ2γ˜ B2.
Proof.
(a) Using the dual representation (2.2.4), the inequality in (a) above is equiv-
alent to the following inequality
sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B1]− 1
γ1
h(Q)
)
+ sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B2]− 1
γ1
h(Q)
)
≥ sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B1 +B2]− 1
γ˜
h(Q)
)
, (2.2.7)
which easily follows.
(b) (1) ⇒ (2). Equation (1) implies that the equality in (2.2.7) holds. By
the strict convexity of the function h(·) on its effective domain, i.e., on
Me,f , and the scaling property (2.2.6), equality in (2.2.7) in turn implies
the equality of dual minimizers
Q(
γ1
γ˜
B1) = Q(
γ2
γ˜
B2) = Q(B1+B2).
By the representation (2.2.5) of the Radon-Nikodym derivatives of the
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above measures, we get
k1e
(ϑ
(
γ1
γ˜ B1)·S)T e
γ1
γ˜
B1 =
dQ(
γ1
γ˜
B1)
dP γ1
γ˜
B1
dP γ1
γ˜
B1
dP
=
dQ(
γ1
γ˜
B1)
dP
=
dQ(
γ2
γ˜
B2)
dP
=
dQ(
γ2
γ˜
B2)
dP γ2
γ˜
B2
dP γ2
γ˜
dP
= k2e
(ϑ
(
γ2
γ˜ B2)·S)T e
γ2
γ˜
B2 ,
and so γ1
γ˜
B1 − γ2γ˜ B2 = (ϑ · S)T + k, where k = log(k2) − log(k1) and
ϑ = ϑ(
γ2
γ˜
B2) − ϑ( γ1γ˜ B1).
(2)⇒ (1). Conversely, suppose that
γ1
γ˜
B1 − γ2
γ˜
B2 = (ϑ · S)T + k,
for some k ∈ R and ϑ ∈ Θ. Using the scaling property (2.2.6), the
equality in (1) is equivalent to
1
γ1
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ˜
B1; γ˜
)
+
1
γ2
ν(w)
(
γ2
γ˜
B2; γ˜
)
=
1
γ˜
ν(w) (B1 +B2; γ˜) . (2.2.8)
By the risk equivalence between γ1
γ˜
B1 and
γ2
γ˜
B2 and the replication in-
variance of v(w)(·; γ˜), we have
1
γ1
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ˜
B1; γ˜
)
+
1
γ2
ν(w)
(
γ2
γ˜
B2; γ˜
)
=
1
γ1
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ˜B1
; γ˜
)
+
1
γ2
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ˜
B1 + k + (ϑ · S)T ; γ˜
)
=
1
γ˜
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ˜
B1; γ˜
)
+
k
γ2
.
On the other hand,
1
γ˜
ν(w) (B1 +B2; γ˜) =
1
γ˜
ν(w)
(
B1 +
γ1
γ2
B1 +
γ˜
γ2
(k + (ϑ · S)T ); γ˜
)
=
1
γ˜
ν(w)
(
γ1
γ˜
B1; γ˜
)
+
k
γ2
.
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The equality in (2.2.8) now follows directly.
The conjugacy between (affine transformations of) the price functional
ν(w)(·; γ|E) and the penalty function h−γE(·), as displayed in Theorem 2.2.4
and Proposition 2.2.8, yields directly the following auxiliary result.
Lemma 2.2.10. For E, E˜ ∈ L∞, γ > 0, the following two statements are
equivalent
1. ν(w)(B; γ|E) ≥ ν(w)(B; γ|E˜), for all B ∈ L∞
and
2. h−γE(Q) ≤ h−γE˜(Q), for all Q ∈Ma.
We use Lemma 2.2.10 in the proof of the following proposition.
Proposition 2.2.11. For E ∈ L∞ and γ > 0, the following statements are
equivalent
1. ν(w) (B; γ) ≥ ν(w)(B; γ|E), for all B ∈ L∞,
2. ν(w) (B; γ) = ν(w)(B; γ|E), for all B ∈ L∞,
3. E ∈ R∞
and
4. Q(0) = Q(−γE).
29
Proof. (4)⇒ (3) As in the proof of implication (1)⇒ (2) in Lemma 2.2.9, we
can use the equation (2.2.5) in Theorem 2.2.4 to show that (4) implies (3).
(3)⇒ (2) Follows immediately from statement (3) in Proposition 2.2.1.
(2)⇒ (1) Clearly, (1) is weaker than (2).
(1)⇒ (4) By Lemma 2.2.10, the equality in (2) implies that h−γE(Q) ≥
h(Q), for all Q ∈Ma, i.e.,
H(Q|P−γE)−H(Q(−γE)|P−γE) ≥ H(Q|P)−H(Q(0)|P), ∀Q ∈Ma.
In particular, for Q = Q(−γE), we get
H(Q(−γE)|P) ≤ H(Q(0)|P).
Therefore, Q(−γE) = Q(0), by the strict convexity of the relative entropy H(·|P)
on its effective domain.
Considered as convex map from L∞ to R, the indifference price is not
homogeneous. In fact, the homogeneity holds only for replicable claims as the
following proposition states.
Proposition 2.2.12. For B,E ∈ L∞ and γ > 0, the following statements are
equivalent
1. ν(w)(αB; γ|E) = αν(w)(B; γ|E), for some α ∈ R \ {0, 1}
and
2. B ∈ R∞.
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Proof. We assume, for simplicity, that E = 0, otherwise, we simply change of
the underlying probability to P−γE (see, also, Proposition 2.2.2).
(2) ⇒ (1) If B ∈ R∞, then αB ∈ R∞, so (1) follows from the
replication-invariance of ν(w) (·; γ).
(1)⇒ (2) Suppose, first, that (1) holds with α > 0. Then
sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B]− 1
γ
h(Q)
)
= sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B]− 1
αγ
h(Q)
)
,
where h(·) stands for h0(·). The two maximized functions are strictly concave,
ordered and agree only for Q such that h(Q) = 0. Therefore, the equality of
their (attained) suprema forces the relation h(Q(γB)) = h(Q(αγB)) = 0, which,
in turn, implies that Q(γB) = Q(αγB) = Q(0). We can conclude that B ∈ R∞
by using the implication (4)⇒ (3) in Proposition 2.2.11.
It remains to treat the case α < 0. By considering the random variable
|α|B instead of B, it is clear that we can assume without loss of generality of
that α = −1. This in turn yields ν(w) (−B; γ) = −ν(w) (B; γ). Equivalently,
we have
inf
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B] +
1
γ
h(Q)
)
= sup
Q∈Ma
(
EQ[B]− 1
γ
h(Q)
)
,
which, by positivity of h(·), implies that h(Q(γB)) = 0. We continue as above
to conclude that B ∈ R∞.
2.2.2 Conditional indifference price and risk aversion coefficient
It follows directly from (2.2.4) that in the case where E ∼ 0, i.e., in
the case of the unconditional indifference prices, the mappings γ 7→ ν(w) (B; γ)
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and γ 7→ −ν(b) (B; γ) are non-decreasing.
Proposition 2.2.13. For γ > 0 and B ∈ L∞, the mapping γ 7→ ν(w) (B; γ)
(γ 7→ ν(b) (B; γ)) is
1. constant over Q ∈Ma and equal to the value EQ[B], when B ∈ R∞
and
2. strictly increasing (decreasing), otherwise.
Proof. We only establish the results for the writer’s price ν(w) (B; γ), as the
case of the buyer’s price follows along similar arguments.
1. By the replication invariance of the ν(w) (·; γ), the value of ν(w) (B; γ)
equals to the value EQ[B], Q ∈Ma, when B ∈ R∞.
2. Suppose now that ν(w) (B; γ1) ≤ ν(w) (B; γ2), for some 0 < γ1 < γ2. By
the dual representation (2.2.4), we have ν(w) (B; γ1) = ν
(w) (B; γ2), and
using the scaling property (2.2.6), we get
αν(w) (B; γ2) = ν
(w) (αB; γ2) ,
where α = γ2/γ1 > 1. By Proposition 2.2.12, B ∈ R∞.
A similar proposition in the conditional case fails. Indeed, here is a
simple example. Pick E 6∈ R∞, and set B = E, Then ν(w)(E; γ|E) = ν(b) (E; γ) -
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a strictly decreasing function of γ. An even more instructive example in which
the dependence of γ ceases to be monotone at all is given below.
Example 2.2.14. We adopt the setting of Example 2.2.3 (stated in page
22), and assume that the coefficients b and a are chosen in such a way that
the distribution function of the random variable YT is continuous (under P,
and, therefore, under every equivalent martingale measure). Let Q(0) be the
minimal-entropy martingale measure and let gi : R → R, i = 1, 2 be two
bounded Borel-measurable functions. We set
E = −g2(YT ) and B = g1(YT )− g2(YT )
and compute the conditional indifference price ν(w)(B; γ|E) as a difference
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = ν(w) (B − E; γ)− ν(w) (−E; γ) .
By part 2 of Proposition 2.2.2 and (2.2.2), we have that
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = ν(w) (g2(YT ); γ)− ν(w) (g1(YT ); γ)
=
1
γ(1− ρ2) lnE
Q(0)
[
eγ(1−ρ
2)g1(YT )
eγ(1−ρ2)g2(YT )
]
.
The intervals of monotonicity of the mapping γ 7→ ν(w)(B; γ|E) therefore co-
incide with the intervals of monotonicity of the function f : (0,∞)→ R given
by
f(γ) =
1
γ
(
lnEQ(0) [Xγ1 ]− lnEQ
(0)
[Xγ2 ]
)
,
where the bounded and positive random variables Xi, are given by
Xi = exp((1− ρ2)gi(YT )), for i = 1, 2.
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It is clear that, thanks to the assumption of continuity of the distribution
function of of the random variable YT , any pair of probability distributions with
compact support in (0,∞) can be chosen for X1 and X2 by the appropriate
choice of the functions g1 and g2.
Thanks to the boundedness of X1 and X2, we can easily obtain the
following asymptotic expansion for the function f around γ = 0:
f(γ) = EQ(0) [X1]− EQ(0) [X2] + 12γ(VarQ(0) [X1]− VarQ(0) [X2]) + o(γ).
In a similar manner, we have
lim
γ→∞
f(γ) = ln ||X1||L∞ − ln ||X2||L∞ .
Therefore, if X1 and X2 satisfy
1. EQ(0) [X1] < EQ
(0)
[X2], and
2. VarQ(0) [X1] < VarQ(0) [X2],
the function f is strictly decreasing and negative in a neighborhood of γ = 0.
If, in addition, we have
3. ||X1||L∞ > ||X2||L∞ ,
and f can not remain decreasing for all γ since
f(+∞) = ln (||X1||L∞/||X2||L∞) > 0 > E[X1]− E[X2] = f(0+).
The straightforward construction of examples of the random variables X1 and
X2 having the above properties is left to the reader.
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2.2.3 Asymptotics of the conditional indifference prices
The asymptotics of the unconditional indifference prices in the risk-
aversion parameter γ are well-known (see, for instance, Corollary 5.1 in [29]),
namely,
lim
γ→0
ν(w) (B; γ) = EQ(0) [B], lim
γ→+∞
ν(w) (B; γ) = sup
Q∈Me,f
EQ[B],
lim
γ→0
ν(b) (B; γ) = EQ(0) [B], lim
γ→+∞
ν(b) (B; γ) = inf
Q∈Me,f
EQ[B].
(2.2.9)
Using the conditional price decomposition stated in part 2 of Proposition 2.2.2,
these asymptotics are easily extended to the conditional case.
Proposition 2.2.15. For B,E ∈ L∞, we have
lim
γ→0
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = EQ(0) [B], lim
γ→0
ν(b)(B; γ|E) = EQ(0) [B] (2.2.10)
and
lim
γ→+∞
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = sup
Q∈Me,f
EQ[B − E] + inf
Q∈Me,f
EQ[E], (2.2.11)
lim
γ→+∞
ν(b)(B; γ|E) = inf
Q∈Me,f
EQ[B − E] + sup
Q∈Me,f
EQ[E]. (2.2.12)
One can, further, establish the continuous differentiability of the map-
ping γ 7→ ν(w)(B; γ|E), for γ ∈ (0,∞). For this, we observe that
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = 1
γ
(
ν(w) (γ(B − E); 1)− ν(w) (−γE; 1)) , (2.2.13)
and we recall the result of Theorem 5.3 in [51], which states that the function
γ 7→ ν(w) (γC; 1) is continuously differentiable on (0,∞) for C ∈ L∞.
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Similar results hold for the indifference price of a vector of contingent
claims. Before we state the corresponding proposition, we introduce some
further notation. For n ∈ N, let (L∞)n denote the set of all n−tuples B =
(B1, B2, . . . , Bn) of elements of L∞, with ||B||(L∞)n = maxk≤n ||Bk||L∞ . For
α = (α1, α2, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn, we write α ·B =
∑n
k=1 αkBk ∈ L∞ and set |α| =
maxk≤n |αk|. Also, EQ[B] stands for the vector (EQ[B1],EQ[B2], ...,EQ[Bn]) ∈
Rn.
Proposition 2.2.16. For E ∈ L∞ and B ∈ (L∞)n, the function
w : Rn × (0,∞]→ R given by
w(α, γ) =
ν
(w)(α ·B; γ|E), γ <∞
sup
Q∈Me,f
EQ[α ·B − E] + inf
Q∈Me,f
EQ[E], γ = +∞, (2.2.14)
is jointly continuous, and Lipschitz continuous on every subset D of the form
D = [γ0,∞)× Rn, γ0 > 0.
Proof. The functional B 7→ ν(w)(B; γ|E) is positive and equal to the identity
mapping for constant claims. Therefore, for γ ∈ (0,∞),∣∣ν(w)(α1 ·B; γ|E)− ν(w)(α2 ·B; γ|E)∣∣ ≤ ||(α1 −α2) ·B||L∞ ≤
≤ |α1 −α2| ||B||(L∞)n .
(2.2.15)
For γ = +∞, the validity of (2.2.15) follows by passing to the limit γ → ∞.
On the other hand, by (2.2.13), for every B ∈ L∞ and γ0 > 0, we have∣∣ν(w)(B; γ1|E)− ν(w)(B; γ2|E)∣∣ ≤ 1γ0 (∣∣ν(w) (γ1(B − E); 1)− ν(w) (γ2(B − E); 1)∣∣
+
∣∣ν(w) (−γ1E; 1)− ν(w) (−γ2E; 1)∣∣) ≤ 1γ0 (||B − E||L∞ + ||E||L∞) |γ1 − γ2|,
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for every γ1, γ2 ∈ [γ0,∞). Therefore, for each γ0 > 0, there exists a constant
C = C(γ0) > 0 such that
|w(α1, γ1)− w(α2, γ2)| ≤ C (|γ1 − γ2|+ |α1 −α2|) ,
for γ1, γ2 ∈ [γ0,∞) and α1,α2 ∈ Rn. It is left to recall from Proposition 2.2.15
that
w(α,∞) = lim
γ→∞
w(α, γ) = sup
Q∈Me,f
EQ[α ·B − E] + inf
Q∈Me,f
EQ[E].
2.3 The Residual Risk at Maturity
The notion of residual risk for the indifference price valuation was de-
fined in [63] for the setting of our Example 2.2.3., in [74] for the stochastic
volatility model and in [64] for a binomial-type model. Below, we redefine this
notion in the case where the agent has a random endowment in her portfolio.
In Appendix A, we present a brief summary of the literature on the residual
risk process.
Let γ > 0 be the agent’s risk-aversion coefficient, and B ∈ L∞ be a
contingent claim. By Theorem 2.2.4, we have that the optimization problem
with the value function uγ(x|ν(w) (B; γ)−B), introduced in (2.1.2), admits an
essentially unique maximizer ϑ(B) ∈ Θ. Following the same notation, ϑ(0) ∈ Θ
stands for the optimal strategy without the claim. We then set
ϑ¯
(B)
t = ϑ
(B)
t − ϑ(0)t ,
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for all t ∈ [0, T ] (note that since Θ is a vector space, ϑ¯(B) ∈ Θ). The corre-
sponding wealth process
X
(B)
t = ν
(w) (B; γ) +
∫ t
0
ϑ¯
(B)
u dSu,
can be interpreted as the optimal risk-monitoring strategy for the writer of
the claim B, compensated by ν(w) (B; γ) at initial time. The hedging error
R(w)(B; γ) = B −X(B)T (2.3.1)
is called the (writer’s) residual risk. R(w)(B; γ) can be interpreted as the
risk remaining after the optimal hedging has been performed. Note that
R(w)(B; γ) = 0, P−a.s., for all replicable claims B ∈ L∞. In the conditional
case, an analogous discussion and the decomposition formula
ν(w)(B; γ|E) = ν(w) (B − E; γ)− ν(w) (−E; γ) ,
(see Proposition 2.2.2) allow us to define the conditional residual riskR(w)(B; γ|E)
by
R(w)(B; γ|E) = R(w)(B − E; γ)−R(w)(−E; γ),
and obtain the decomposition
B = ν(w)(B; γ|E) +
∫ T
0
ϑ¯
(B|E)
t dSt +R
(w)(B; γ|E), (2.3.2)
where ϑ¯
(B|E)
t = ϑ¯
(B−E)
t − ϑ¯(−E)t = ϑ(B−E)t − ϑ(−E)t , t ∈ [0, T ].
The process (ϑ¯
(B|E)
t )t∈[0,T ], as well as the decomposition (2.3.2), could
have been derived equivalently using the optimization problems used to define
the conditional indifference prices.
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All of the above concepts have natural analogues when seen from the
buyer’s side. Namely, we define the (buyer’s) residual risk by R(b)(B; γ) =
R(w)(−B; γ) and by R(b)(B; γ|E) = R(b)(B+E; γ)−R(b)(E; γ) in the conditional
case.
Remark 2.3.1. Using decomposition (2.3.2) and Proposition 2.2.6, we observe
that
ν(b)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) = ν(b)(B; γ|E)− ν(w)(B; γ|E).
In particular, ν(b)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) < 0 for all E ∈ R∞, and B ∈ L∞ \ R∞.
We also note that
ν(w)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) = 0,
for every E, B ∈ L∞.
2.4 Second Order Price Approximation
In general market models, it is not possible to obtain a closed-form
representation of the indifference prices. Hence an asymptotic approximation
of the prices can be very useful. In this section we provide a rather general
Taylor-type approximation of the conditional exponential indifference price for
our locally bounded semimartingale model under the additional assumption
of continuous filtrations. In the proof of the approximation, we establish that
the indifference price as a function of claim units is twice differentiable and we
also give a representation of its second derivative.
Asymptotic techniques are not new in utility maximization problems.
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In [60], a first order approximation of the optimal hedging strategy in a semi-
martingale market for general utilities (defined on the positive real line) is
provided. In [59], Theorem 10, a second order approximation is given when
utility functions defined on the positive real line are considered. This general-
izes the results of [44] and [46]. For exponential utility, the first derivative of
the indifference price for a vector of claims is given in [51]. By imposing the
assumption of continuity on the filtration, we generalize their result as well as
the asymptotic approximation in [72].
2.4.1 The first and the second derivatives
We suppose that the claim under consideration has the form α ·B for
a some vector B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) in (L∞)n, where α ∈ Rn. To facilitate
the reading, we use the notation
w(α) = ν(w)(α ·B; γ|E),
for α ∈ Rn.
A straightforward extension of Theorem 5.1 in [51], where we use the
fact that the conditional indifference prices are just the unconditional ones
under a change of measure, yields the following result.
Proposition 2.4.1. The function w is continuously differentiable on Rn with
∇w(α) = EQ(γα·B−γE) [B] = (EQ(γα·B−γE) [B1], . . . ,EQ(γα·B−γE) [Bn]), α ∈ Rn.
The concept of minimized variance, defined below, is important for the
study of second derivatives of the function w.
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Definition 2.4.2. Let Q ∈Me be an arbitrary equivalent martingale measure.
1. For B ∈ L∞ we define the projected variance ∆Q(B) of B under Q as
∆Q(B) = inf
ϑ∈Θ2Q
EQ
[
(B − EQ[B]− (ϑ · S)T )2
]
, (2.4.1)
where, Θ2Q = {ϑ ∈ L(S) : (ϑ · S) is square integrable Q −martingale},
so that
⋂
Q∈Me,f
Θ2Q ⊂ Θ.
2. For B1, B2 ∈ L∞ we define the projected covariance ∆Q(B1, B2) of B1
and B2 by
∆Q(B1, B2) =
1
2
(∆Q(B1 +B2)−∆Q(B1)−∆Q(B2)).
3. For a vector B = (B1, . . . , Bn) ∈ (L∞)n and a probability measure
Q ∈Me, we define the Q−projected variance-covariance matrix ∆Q(B)
by
∆Qij(B) = ∆
Q(Bi, Bj), i, j = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 2.4.3.
1. The projected variance ∆Q(B) is the square of the L2(Q)−norm of
the projection PQ(B) of the random variable B ∈ L∞ ⊆ L2(Q) onto
the closed subspace R ⊕ {(ϑ · S)T : ϑ ∈ Θ2Q} of L2(Q) (the closeness
of
{
(ϑ · S)T : ϑ ∈ Θ2Q
}
in L2(Q) is an immediate consequence of the
L2(d[S])-L2(Q) isometry of stochastic integration). It follows that the
projected covariance ∆Q(B1, B2) can be represented as
∆Q(B1, B2) = EQ[PQ(B1)PQ(B2)].
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In particular, ∆Q(·, ·) is a bilinear functional on L∞ × L∞ and the fol-
lowing equality holds
∆Q(α ·B) = α ·∆Q · (B)α =
n∑
i,j=1
αi∆
Q
ij(B)αj, (2.4.2)
for all Q ∈Me, B ∈ (L∞)n and α = (α1, . . . , αn) ∈ Rn.
2. Details on the notion of the projected variance, which is closely related
to mean-variance hedging, can be found in [38] or [71]. Note that the
existence of the minimizer in the Definition 2.4.2 for bounded claims can
be established using the Kunita-Watanabe decomposition of the uni-
formly integrable Q−martingale (Bt)t∈[0,T ], defined as Bt = EQ[B|Ft].
For details on the Kunita-Watanabe decomposition we refer the reader
to [2].
We recall that a filtration is called continuous if all adapted local mar-
tingales admit continuous versions.
Lemma 2.4.4. Suppose that n = 1 and that the filtration F is continuous.
Then, for B,E ∈ L∞, the function w : R → R is twice differentiable at any
α ∈ R and its second derivative is given by
w′′(α) = γ∆Q
(γαB−γE)
(B). (2.4.3)
Proof. Without loss of generality we may suppose that E = 0 (otherwise, we
work under the measure P−γE). We first focus on the case α = 0 and by
Proposition 2.4.1, we get that w′(0) = EQ(0) [B]. Since ∆ is clearly invariant
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under constant translation, we can to assume, in addition, that EQ(0) [B] = 0.
It will, therefore, suffice to show that
lim
α→0
∣∣∣∣ν(w) (αB; γ)α2 − γ2 ∆Q(0)(B)
∣∣∣∣ = 0.
By the sign invariance of ∆Q
(0)
(·) and the scaling property (2.2.6) of the in-
difference prices, it suffices to consider only α > 0, i.e., it suffices to establish
that
lim
α↘0
∣∣∣∣ν(w) (B;αγ)α − γ2 ∆Q(0)(B)
∣∣∣∣ = 0. (2.4.4)
Theorem A.2.1 and the definition of the residual risk process in Appendix A
yield that
ν(w) (B;αγ)
α
=
γ
2
EQ(0) [〈L(w)(B;αγ)〉T ] = γ
2
EQ(0) [L(w)T (B;αγ)
2],
where (L
(w)
t (B;αγ))t∈[0,T ] is as in Theorem A.2.1. The BMO(Q(0))−convergence
of the processes (L
(w)
t (B;αγ))t∈[0,T ] from the same theorem, implies, in par-
ticular (see Theorem A.3.2), the L2(Ω,F,Q(0))−convergence of their terminal
values, i.e.,
L
(w)
T (B;αγ)→ L(w)T (B; 0) in L2(Ω,F,Q(0)).
Therefore, it remains to prove that
EQ(0)
[
L
(w)
T (B; 0)
2
]
= ∆Q
(0)
(B), ∀B ∈ L∞.
Thanks to the final part of Theorem A.2.1, L(w)(B; 0) is strongly orthogonal
to any process of the form (ϑ · S), for ϑ ∈ Θ2Q(0) . In particular, for ϑ ∈ Θ2Q(0)
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and ϑˆ
(B)
as in Theorem A.2.1, we have
B − (ϑ · S)T =
(
(ϑˆ
(B) − ϑ) · S)
T
+ L
(w)
T (B; 0),
Therefore,
EQ(0)
[
(B − (ϑ · S)T )2
]
= EQ(0)
[((
(ϑˆ
(B) − ϑ) · S)
T
)2]
+ EQ(0)
[
L
(w)
T (B; 0)
2
]
.
Consequently, the minimum in the definition of ∆Q
(0)
(B) is attained at ϑ =
ϑˆ
(B)
. Therefore, ∆Q(B) = EQ(0) [L(w)T (B; 0)2] and we conclude.
For α 6= 0, we may again assume that
w′(α) = EQ(γαB) [B] = 0.
Hence, it is enough to show that
lim
ε→0
w(α + ε)− w(α)
ε2
=
γ
2
∆Q
(αγB)
(B).
For this, we note that w(α+ε)−w(α) = v(w)(εB|−αB; γ), i.e., we can rewrite
the second derivative at some α 6= 0 as the second derivative at α = 0 with
random endowment. This observation finishes the proof.
The case n > 1 is covered by the following lemma.
Lemma 2.4.5. For α, δ ∈ Rn, B ∈ (L∞)n and E ∈ L∞ and when the filtration
F is continuous, we have
lim
ε→0
w(α+ εδ)− w(α)− ε∇w(α) · δ
ε2
= 1
2
n∑
i,j=1
δi∆
Q(γα·B−γE)
ij (B)δj. (2.4.5)
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Proof. We can assume that α = (0, . . . , 0) by absorbing the term −α ·B into
the random endowment E. The left-hand side of (2.4.5) can now be viewed as
the second derivative at 0 of the function w˜ : R→ R given by
w˜(ε) = ν(w)(εδ ·B; γ|E).
We finish the proof by employing Lemma 2.4.4 and using the equality (2.4.2),
with Q = Q(−γE) and δ substituted for α.
2.4.2 Approximation formula and examples
With the above results in our toolbox, we can give a second order
directional Taylor-type approximation of the indifference price.
Proposition 2.4.6. Let B ∈ (L∞)n, α ∈ Rn, γ > 0 and E ∈ L∞, and assume
that the filtration F is continuous. With the notions of projected variance and
covariance as in Definition 2.4.2, we have as ε→ 0
ν(w)(εα ·B; γ|E) = εα · EQ(−γE) [B] + ε
2γ
2
α ·∆Q(−γE)(B) ·α+ o(ε2). (2.4.6)
Example 2.4.7. For the setup of Example 2.2.3, the corresponding approx-
imation result is easily obtained by formula (2.2.2) (see, e.g., [44]). After
changing the measure P to P−γE, it is straightforward to show that
ν(w)(αB; γ|E) = αEQ(−γE) [B] + α
2
2
γ(1− ρ2) VarQ(−γE)(B) + o(α2), ∀B ∈ L∞,
where VarQ(B) denotes the variance of random variable B under the proba-
bility measure Q, i.e., ∆Q(−γE) (B) = (1− ρ2) VarQ(−γE) (B).
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Example 2.4.8. In the cases where there is no closed-form expression for the
indifference price, the approximation (2.4.6) is rather useful. One of these cases
is the stochastic volatility model studied in [72] and [50] (see also [45]). In this
model, we suppose the existence of one risky traded asset, whose dynamics are
given by
dSt = µ(t)St + σ(Yt, t)StdW
(1)
t
dYt = b(Yt, t)dt+ a(Yt, t)
(
ρdW
(1)
t + ρ
′dW (2)t
)
,
where µ is a bounded smooth function and W (1) =
(
W (1)
)
t∈[0,T ] and W
(2) =(
W (2)
)
t∈[0,T ] are independent Brownian Motions (for further technical assump-
tions we refer the reader to [72]).
We consider claims whose payoffs are of the form B = g(ST , YT ), where
g : R× R→ R is a bounded Borel function. For this family of claims there is
no closed-form representation of the indifference price v(w)(B; γ) (in [72] a fully
non-linear partial differential equation, whose solution is the dynamic version
of the indifference price is stated together with results on the measure Q(0)).
However, it is well-known (see [72], page 1336) that under Q(0) the dynamics
of the traded asset become
dSt = σ(Yt, t)StdW˜
(1)
t
dYt = (K(Yt, t)) dt+ a(Yt, t)
(
ρdW˜
(1)
t + ρ
′dW˜ (2)t
)
,
where K(Yt, t) is an adapted process and W˜
(1) = (W˜ (1))t∈[0,T ] and W˜ (2) =
(W˜ (2))t∈[0,T ] are two independent Brownian Motions under Q(0). Setting W˜t =
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(W˜
(1)
t , W˜
(2)
t )t∈[0,T ], we get from the martingale representation theorem that
for every claim payoff B ∈ L∞(Ω,FW˜T ,Q(0)) there exists a process Ht =
(H
(1)
t , H
(1)
t )t∈[0,T ], such that
B = EQ(0) [B] +
∫ T
0
H
(1)
t dW˜
(1)
t +
∫ T
0
H
(2)
t dW˜
(2)
t .
Hence, thanks to the independence between W˜ (1) and W˜ (2) we have
∆Q
(0)
(B) = inf
ϑ∈Θ2
Q(0)
EQ(0)
{[
B − EQ(0) [B]− (ϑ · S)T
]2}
= inf
ϑ∈Θ2
Q(0)
{
EQ(0)
[(∫ T
0
H
(1)
t − ϑtσ(Yt, t)St
)2
dt
]
+ EQ(0)
[∫ T
0
(
H
(2)
t
)2
dt
]}
.
Since the process ϑˆt =
H
(1)
t
σ(Yt,t)St
belongs to Θ2Q(0) , it follows that
∆Q
(0)
(B) = EQ(0)
[∫ T
0
(
H
(2)
t
)2
dt
]
. (2.4.7)
Proposition 2.4.6 and assertion (2.4.7) provide a generalization of the approx-
imation results of subsection 4.3 in [50].
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Chapter 3
Agents’ Agreement
The aim of this chapter is to introduce the notion of the agreement be-
tween financial agents and determine the conditions under which it is possible
for two agents to agree on non-replicable claims. We first give the correspond-
ing definition of a mutually agreeable claim and some properties of the set
of such claims. Then, a non-agreement argument in the case of replicable
random endowment is presented. In Section 3.3, the necessary and sufficient
condition, in terms of the random endowments and the risk aversion coeffi-
cients, for agreement to hold is established and discussed. Finally, in the last
two sections of this chapter, we relate the residual risk and the asymptotic
approximation of the indifference price with the notion of agreement.
In what follows, we deal with the interaction of two financial agents,
with risk aversion coefficients γ1 and γ2 and random endowments E1,E2 ∈ L∞,
respectively.
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3.1 The Mutually Agreeable Claims
The indirect utility uγ(·|E) induces a preference relation γ,E, on L∞;
for B1, B2 ∈ L∞, we set
B1 γ,E B2 if uγ(B1|E) ≤ uγ(B2|E).
In words, the payoff B2 is preferable to the payoff B1 for the agent with random
endowment E and risk aversion coefficient γ, if the total payoff E + B2 yields
to her more indirect utility than the payoff E+B1.
Closely related to the relation γ,E is its strict version ≺γ,E, defined by
B1 ≺γ,E B2 if uγ(B1|E) < uγ(B2|E),
for B1, B2 ∈ L∞. Note that Aγ(E) = {B ∈ L∞ : 0 γ,E B} and A◦γ(E) =
{B ∈ L∞ : 0 ≺γ,E B}.
Given the agents’ preference relations, we are ready to determine those
claims the transaction of which benefits both agents.
Definition 3.1.1. A contingent claim B ∈ L∞ is said to be
1. mutually agreeable if there exists a number p ∈ R such that p − B ∈
Aγ1(E1) and B − p ∈ Aγ2(E2).
2. strictly mutually agreeable if there exists a number p ∈ R such that
p−B ∈ A◦γ1(E1) and B − p ∈ A◦γ2(E2).
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If a claim B is (strictly) mutually agreeable, the set of all p ∈ R such that
p−B ∈ Aγ1(E1) and B−p ∈ Aγ2(E2) (or p−B ∈ A◦γ1(E1) and B−p ∈ A◦γ2(E2))
is called the set of (strictly) mutually-agreeable prices for B.
Remark 3.1.2. A discussion related to our notion of mutually agreeability is
given in [52], subsection 3.6, for cash invariant monetary utility functions, but
without the presence of a financial market.
Using the conditional writer’s and buyer’s indifference prices, ν(w)(·; γ1|E1)
and ν(b)(·; γ2|E2), we can give a simple characterization of the set of mutually-
agreeable prices.
Proposition 3.1.3. A claim B ∈ L∞ is mutually agreeable if and only if
ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) ≤ ν(b)(B; γ2|E2). (3.1.1)
In that case, the set of mutually-agreeable prices for B is given by
[ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)].
Remark 3.1.4.
1. A version of Proposition 3.1.3 for strict mutually-agreeable prices, with
strict inequality in (3.1.1) and the interval [ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)]
replaced by its interior (ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)), holds.
2. For a contingent claim B ∈ L∞ \R∞, each (strictly) mutually agreeable
price p of B satisfies p ∈ (infQ∈Ma EQ[B], supQ∈Ma EQ[B]) (see, e.g., [66],
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Proposition 7.2), i.e., every mutually-agreeable price is an arbitrage-
free price. Trivially, every claim B ∈ R∞ is mutually-agreeable and the
mutually-agreeable price is unique and equal to the unique arbitrage-free
price.
Remark 3.1.5. Thanks to the choice of the exponential utility, the case where
the agents have different subjective probability measures, say P1 6= P2, is also
covered. Indeed, if we assume that P1 ≈ P2 and ln(dP1dP2 ) ∈ L∞, we can reduce
the analysis to the case of two agents with the same subjective measure, say
P2, by adding γ1 ln(dP1dP2 ) to the first agent’s random endowment.
It will be important in the sequel to introduce the following notation
for the set of all (strictly) mutually agreeable claims.
G = {B ∈ L∞ : B is mutually agreeable} , and,
G◦ = {B ∈ L∞ : B is strictly mutually agreeable} .
We remind the reader that R∞ is the set of all replicable claims in L∞.
Proposition 3.1.6. The following statements hold
1. G is convex and σ(L∞,L1)-closed.
2. G ∩ (−G) = R∞, G◦ ∩ (−G◦) = ∅.
3. G = L∞ if and only if R∞ = L∞.
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Proof.
1. The convexity of G follows from the convexity of ν(w)(·; γ1|E1) and the
concavity of ν(b)(·; γ2|E2) (see Proposition 2.2.6). As for its closedness, it
is enough to note that ν(w)(·; γ1|E1) : L∞ → R is lower semi-continuous
and ν(b)(·; γ2|E2) : L∞ → R is upper semi-continuous with respect to the
weak-* topology σ(L∞,L1) (see Corollary 2.2.5).
2. Trivially, R∞ ⊆ G ∩ (−G). For a claim B ∈ G ∩ (−G), there exists
p, pˆ ∈ R such that p − B ∈ Aγ1(E1) and B − p ∈ Aγ2(E2) , as well as
pˆ + B ∈ Aγ1(E1) and −B − pˆ ∈ Aγ2(E2). It follows, by the convexity of
Aγ1(E1) that
1
2
(p+ pˆ) =
1
2
(p−B + pˆ+B) ∈ Aγ1(E1),
i.e., uγ1(0|E1) ≤ uγ1(12(p + pˆ)|E1). The strict monotonicity of the value
function uγ1(·|E1), for deterministic arguments, implies that 12(p+pˆ) ≥ 0.
Applying the same line of reasoning to Aγ2(E2) and the value function
uγ2(·|E2), we get that −12(p + pˆ) ≥ 0, and, consequently, p = −pˆ. Using
the definitions (2.1.6) and (2.1.7) of the conditional indifference prices,
we easily get that
ν(b)(B; γ1|E1) ≥ p ≥ ν(w)(B; γ1|E1),
which, according to Corollary 3.2.2, implies that B ∈ R∞.
To prove the second claim, it suffices to observe that G◦ ∩ R∞ = ∅.
Indeed, ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) = ν(b)(B; γ2|E2) = EQ[B] for B ∈ R∞ and all
Q ∈Ma.
52
3. If G = L∞ then L∞ ⊆ G ∩ (−G) so L∞ = R∞, by (2) above. Conversely,
if L∞ = R∞ then L∞ = G ∩ (−G) ⊆ G.
Remark 3.1.7. The weak-* topology σ(L∞,L1) in Proposition 3.1.6 can be
replaced by an even weaker one, namely the coarsest topology τ on L∞ which
makes the expectation mappings EQ[·] : L∞ → R continuous for each Q ∈
Me,f .
3.2 No Agreement Without Random Endowments
In this section, we state an at first glance surprising result according to
which mere difference in risk-aversion is not enough for two exponential agents
to agree on a price for any contingent claim. Qualitatively, different random
endowments are needed.
Proposition 3.2.1 (Non-agreement with replicable random endowments).
Suppose that E1 ∼ E2 ∼ 0. Then G = R∞ and G◦ = ∅.
Proof. The limiting relationships in (2.2.9) and the monotonicity properties of
the indifference prices (see Proposition 2.2.13) imply that
ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) = ν(w) (B; γ1) ≥ EQ(0) [B]
≥ ν(b) (B; γ2) = ν(b)(B; γ2|E2),
(3.2.1)
for all B ∈ L∞. Therefore, the strict inequality ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) < ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)
- needed for the strong agreement - cannot hold. Consequently, G◦ = ∅.
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If B ∈ G, (3.2.1) implies that ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) = ν(w) (B; γ1) = EQ(0) [B] =
limγ→0 ν(w) (B; γ). Therefore, the function γ 7→ ν(w) (B; γ) can not be strictly
increasing on (0,∞), so, by Proposition 2.2.13, we must have B ∈ R∞. Hence,
G ⊆ R∞, which implies that G = R∞.
The following result follows directly from Proposition 3.2.1 and the fact
that the conditional indifference price becomes unconditional if the measure P
is changed to P−γE (see part 2 of Proposition 2.2.2).
Corollary 3.2.2. Suppose that E1 ∼ E2. Then for every γ > 0 and B ∈ L∞,
we have {
ν(w)(B; γ|E1) > ν(b)(B; γ|E2) for B /∈ R∞,
ν(w)(B; γ|E1) = ν(b)(B; γ|E2) otherwise.
Remark 3.2.3. A non-agreement problem in the case where the agents’ util-
ity functions are defined on the positive real line is addressed in [23]. More
precisely, the authors deal with the special case when the market incomplete-
ness comes from the presence of “extraneous risk” and conclude that there is
no agreement between the agents on non-replicable, not-necessarily-bounded
claims. However, their arguments depend heavily on the special structure of
the market and do not generalize directly to our setting.
3.3 Agreement With Random Endowments
Proposition 3.2.1 states that the absence of random endowments is a
sufficient condition for the lack of (strict) agreement. Is it also necessary?
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Given the result of Proposition 3.1.3, the question of the existence of non-
replicable mutually agreeable claims leads to the following optimization prob-
lem with value function Σ : (0,∞)2 × (L∞)2 → [0,+∞], where
Σ(γ1, γ2,E1,E2) = sup
B∈L∞
(
ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)− ν(w)(B; γ1|E1)
)
. (3.3.1)
The following result holds directly from Definition 3.1.1 of the set G.
Proposition 3.3.1. For E1,E2 ∈ L∞, γ1, γ2 ∈ (0,∞) and Σ = Σ(γ1, γ2,E1,E2),
the following two statements are equivalent
1. G◦ 6= ∅
and
2. Σ > 0.
Remark 3.3.2. The optimization problem above permits an interpretation in
terms of the so-called optimal risk-sharing problem. In the case where the
agents do not have access to a financial market, this problem has been ad-
dressed by many authors (see, e.g., [14] for its relation to the insurance-
reinsurance problem, [48] and [9] for the exponential utility case, [52] for mon-
etary utility functionals and [11] for concave preference functionals). When
a financial market is present, the problem of optimal risk sharing when both
agents have exponential utility has been studied in [10], where the authors
focus on the form of the optimal structure.
Before we proceed, we introduce the following quantities.
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Definition 3.3.3.
1. The sum E = E1 + E2 of the random endowments of the agents is called
the aggregate endowment.
2. A pair (B1, B2) in (L∞)2 is called an allocation, while an allocation
(B1, B2) such that B1 + B2 = E is called a feasible allocation; the set
of all feasible allocations will be denoted by F (E)
3. For an allocation (B1, B2), the sum ν
(b) (B1; γ1) + ν
(b) (B2; γ2), denoted
by σ(B1, B2), is called the score of (B1, B2). The difference σ(B1, B2)−
σ(E1,E2) is called the excess score (where, for simplicity, the parameters
γ1 and γ2 are omitted from the notation).
By Proposition 2.2.2, the expression ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)− ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) ap-
pearing in (3.3.1) above can be rewritten as
ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)− ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) = ν(b)(B; γ2|E2) + ν(b)(−B; γ1|E1)
= (ν(b) (B + E2; γ2)− ν(b) (E2; γ2)) + (ν(b) (−B + E1; γ1)− ν(b) (E1; γ1))
= σ(E1 −B,E2 +B)− σ(E1,E2).
(3.3.2)
Hence,
Σ(γ1, γ2,E1,E2) = sup {σ(B1, B2) : (B1, B2) ∈ F (E)} − σ(E1,E2).
In other words, Σ is the maximized the excess score. If we think of the aggre-
gate endowment E as the total wealth of our two-agent economy, the solution of
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(3.3.1) (if it exists) will provide a redistribution of wealth so as to maximize the
(improvement in) the score. Even though there is no direct economic reason
why the sum of individual indifference prices should be maximized, Proposi-
tion 3.3.4 - which is a mere restatement of the discussion above - explains why
the score is a useful concept.
Proposition 3.3.4. For each B ∈ L∞, the following two statements are equiv-
alent
1. B ∈ G◦
and
2. σ(E1 −B,E2 +B) > σ(E1,E2).
The following proposition characterizes the score-optimal allocation,
(compare to Theorem 2.3 in [10] and see also [14] and [48]).
Proposition 3.3.5. For any E1,E2 ∈ L∞ and γ1, γ2 > 0 there exists B∗ ∈ L∞
such that
σ(E1 −B∗,E2 +B∗) ≥ σ(B1, B2), for all (B1, B2) ∈ F (E).
Moreover, B∗ is unique up to replicability and
B∗ ∼ γ1E1 − γ2E2
γ1 + γ2
.
Proof. By (3.3.2), it suffices to show that
ν(w) (−B∗ − E2; γ2) + ν(w) (B∗ − E1; γ1)
≤ ν(w) (−B − E2; γ2) + ν(w) (B − E1; γ1) ,
(3.3.3)
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for all B ∈ L∞. The left hand side of (3.3.3) equals to
ν(w)
(
− γ1
γ1 + γ2
E; γ2
)
+ ν(w)
(
− γ2
γ1 + γ2
E; γ1
)
=
1
γ2
v(w)
(
− γ1γ2
γ1 + γ2
E; 1
)
+
1
γ1
v(w)
(
− γ1γ2
γ1 + γ2
E; 1
)
= v(w)(−E; γ˜),
where we recall that γ˜ = 1
γ1
+ 1
γ2
. Hence (3.3.3) is equivalent to
ν(w) (B − E1; γ1) + ν(w) (−B − E2; γ2) ≥ ν(w) (−E1 − E2; γ˜) ,
which holds true by Lemma 2.2.9, where the equality is valid if and only if
γ1
γ˜
(B − E1) ∼ γ2γ˜ (−B − E2)
or equivalently if and only if
B ∼ γ1E1 − γ2E2
γ1 + γ2
.
Corollary 3.3.6. The following statements are equivalent
1. G◦ = ∅,
2. B∗ = γ1E1−γ2E2
γ1+γ2
is replicable
and
3. γ1
γ2
E1 ∼ E2.
58
Remark 3.3.7. We can relate the existence of mutually agreeable non-replicable
claims with the well-known notion of Pareto optimality . More precisely, an
allocation (B1, B2) ∈ F (E) is called Pareto optimal if @(C1, C2) ∈ F (E) such
that Bi γi,Ei Ci for i = 1, 2 and Bi ≺γi,Ei Ci, for at least one i = 1, 2. It
follows from Corollary 3.3.6, that the condition γ1
γ2
E1 ∼ E2 implies that the
allocation (E1,E2) is the unique (up to replicability) Pareto optimal one. If
γ1
γ2
E1 6∼ E2, a transaction involving the optimal claim B∗ will lead to a Pareto
optimal allocation.
3.4 When is a Given Claim Mutually Agreeable?
In this section we attempt to answer the following question:
Provided that γ1
γ2
E1  E2, when does a given claim B belong to G?
For this, we propose two approaches: one through the notion of residual
risk and the other based on the asymptotic approximation of the conditional
indifference prices for small quantities.
3.4.1 Agreement and residual risk
As we have seen, the writer’s residual risk of a claim B is the difference
of the agent’s liability and the optimal wealth at maturity. Intuitively, this
means that a given claim is mutually agreeable if trading this claim results
in improvement of the agents’ residual risk exposure. Below, we make this
statement precise.
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First we recall from Remark 2.3.1 that
ν(b)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) = ν(b)(B; γ|E)− ν(w)(B; γ|E),
and hence the agreement condition (3.1.1) can also be written as
B ∈ G⇔ ν(b)(R(w)(B; γ|E); γ|E) ≥ 0.
The following proposition gives a characterization of mutually agreeable
contingent claims in terms of their residual risk.
Proposition 3.4.1. For B ∈ L∞, the following statements are equivalent
1. B ∈ G,
2. the inequality
EQ
[
R(w)(B; γ1|E1)
]
+ EQ
[
R(b)(B; γ2|E2)
] ≥ 0 (3.4.1)
holds for some Q ∈Me,f ,
3. the inequality
EQ
[
R(w)(B − E1; γ1)−R(w)(−E1; γ1)
]
+
EQ
[
R(w)(−B − E2; γ2)−R(w)(−E2; γ2)
] ≥ 0 (3.4.2)
holds for some Q ∈Me,f ,
4. the inequality (3.4.1) holds for all Q ∈Me,f
and
5. the inequality (3.4.2) holds for all Q ∈Me,f .
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Proof. It is enough to make the following two observations
(a) thanks to the definition (2.3.1) of residual risk, we have that the differ-
ences ν(w)(B; γ1|E1)− R(w)(B; γ1|E1) and ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)− R(b)(B; γ2|E2)
are both of the form
∫ T
0
ϑt dSt with ϑ ∈ Θ, and
(b) the following equality holds
R(w)(B; γ1|E1)−R(b)(B; γ2|E2) = R(w)(B − E1; γ1)−R(w)(−E1; γ1)
+R(w)(−B − E2; γ2)−R(w)(−E2; γ2).
Remark 3.4.2. It should be pointed out that it is enough to check the above
inequalities only for some probability measure in Me,f . Also, it follows from
the definition of the residual risk that inequality (3.4.1) implies that the trans-
action of claim B at any price p will decrease the sum of expected residual
risks. If in addition p ∈ (ν(w)(B; γ1|E1), ν(b)(B; γ2|E2)), each agent’s expected
residual risk will be decreased.
Under the additional mild assumption of continuity for the filtration F,
we can replace the criterion given in Proposition 3.4.1 by the following one,
which sometimes is easier to check (see Section 2.3 for the additional notation).
Proposition 3.4.3. Suppose that F is continuous. For B ∈ L∞, the following
two statements are equivalent
1. B ∈ G
and
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2. γ1EQ
(0)
[〈
R(w)(B − E1; γ1)
〉
T
−
〈
R(w)(−E1; γ1)
〉
T
]
+
+ γ2EQ
(0)
[〈
R(w)(−B + E2; γ2)
〉
T
−
〈
R(w)(E2; γ2)
〉
T
]
≥ 0.
Proof. It follows by part 2 of Theorem A.2.1 that
〈
R(w)(B; γ)
〉
t
=
〈
L(w)(B; γ)
〉
t
for all t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence, R(w)t (B; γ)− γ2
〈
R(w)(B; γ)
〉
t
is a Q(0)−martingale, for
any γ > 0 and B ∈ L∞. The desired equivalence then follows by Proposition
3.4.1.
Remark 3.4.4. In the case where a claim B is mutually agreeable, the exact
price p ∈ (ν(b)(B; γ|E), ν(w)(B; γ|E)) at which the transaction will take place
in not determined by the arguments above. For the specification of this price,
a negotiation model is necessary. A pricing scheme related to this problem is
given in [3], where the agents’ risk preferences are modelled by general utility
functions.
Example 3.4.5. We adopt the setup of Example 2.2.3 and suppose that
E1 = g1(YT ) and E2 = g2(YT ) for some Borel bounded functions, g1 and g2.
Proposition 3.1.3 and representation (2.2.2) imply that B = g(YT ) ∈ G if and
only if EQ(0)
(
eγ1B˜e−γ1E˜1
)
EQ(0)
(
e−γ1E˜1
)

γ2
γ1
≤
EQ(0)
(
e−γ2E˜2
)
EQ(0)
(
e−γ2E˜2e−γ2B˜
) ,
where B˜ = (1− ρ2)B and E˜i = (1− ρ2)Ei, i = 1, 2.
As we have seen, ν(w) (B; γ1) > ν
(b) (B; γ2), ∀B  0. It is easy to verify
that ν(w)(B; γ1|E1) ≤ ν(w) (B; γ1) if and only if CovQ(0)(E1, B) ≥ 0, where
CovQ
(0)
(., .) is the covariance under the measure Q(0). This means that the
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presence of a random endowment which is positively correlated with the claim
payoff, reduces the writer’s indifference price.
Similarly, ν(b)(B; γ2|E2) ≥ ν(b) (B; γ2) if and only if CovQ(0)(E2, B) ≤ 0.
Therefore, we infer that a necessary condition for a claim B to be mutually
agreeable is that CovQ
(0)
(E1, B) > 0, or Cov
Q(0)(E2, B) < 0.
3.4.2 Agreement and price approximation
Although the asymptotic expansion (2.4.6) in Proposition 2.4.6 above
is important in its own right, it can also be applied to provide the follow-
ing criterion for mutual agreement for a small quantity of a given contingent
claim. In other words, when the size of the claim whose price is negotiated is
small compared to the sizes of agent’s contingent claims (and this is typically
the case in practice), one can use a Taylor-type expansion of the indifference
price around 0, and obtain more precise quantitative answers to the agreement
question. This is discussed next.
Proposition 3.4.6. Suppose that F is continuous and that the random en-
dowments E1,E2 ∈ L∞ and risk-aversion coefficients γ1, γ2 > 0 are chosen.
Let B ∈ L∞ be a given contingent claim. The set G◦ contains a segment of the
form
{αB : α ∈ (0, α0)} for some α0 > 0 iff ,EQ(−γ1E1) [B] < EQ(−γ2E2) [B].
Similarly, the set G◦ contains a segment of the form
{αB : α ∈ (−α0, 0)} for some α0 > 0 iff ,EQ(−γ1E1) [B] > EQ(−γ2E2) [B].
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Proof. We first note that the convexity of G◦ implies that, if there exists α0 > 0
such that α0B ∈ G◦, then αB ∈ G◦, for all α ∈ (0, α0]. By equation (2.4.6),
ν(w)(αB; γ1|E1) = αEQ(−γ1E1) [B] + o(α)
and
ν(b)(αB; γ2|E2) = αEQ(−γ2E2) [B] + o(α).
Hence, the inequality EQ(−γ1E1) [B] < EQ(−γ2E2) [B] yields that there exists α0 > 0
small enough such that ν(w)(α0B; γ1|E1) < ν(b)(α0B; γ2|E2), i.e., α0B ∈ G◦.
On the other hand, suppose that there exists α0 > 0 such that α0B ∈
G◦ and assume that EQ(−γ1E1) [B] ≥ EQ(−γ2E2) [B]. It is easy to check that
∆Q
(−γiEi)(B) > 0 for i = 1, 2 (since B /∈ R∞). Also, by (2.4.6) and its buyer’s
version, we get
αEQ(−γ1E1) [B] +
α2γ1
2
∆Q
(−γ1E1)(B) < αEQ(−γ2E2) [B]− α
2γ2
2
∆Q
(−γ2E2)(B) + o(α2)
for every α close to zero such that 0 < α ≤ α0 (note that thanks to the
linearity of Θ2Q, we have ∆
Q(B) = ∆Q(−B), ∀B ∈ L∞).
This implies that for any such α
α2
2
(γ1∆
Q(−γ1E1)(B) + γ2∆
Q(−γ2E2)(B)) + o(α2) < 0,
Dividing through by α2 and letting α→ 0, we get that
γ1∆
Q(−γ1E1)(B) + γ2∆
Q(−γ2E2)(B) ≤ 0,
which is a contradiction. The proof of the second argument is similar and
hence omitted.
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Remark 3.4.7. It is clear from Proposition 3.4.6 that the order of the marginal
prices, EQ(−γ1E1) [B] and EQ(−γ2E2) [B], specifies which of the agents is willing to
be the writer and which the seller of some units of claim B. We can further
provide an approximation of the size of the set of the agreement prices for
small number of units. More precisely, if EQ(−γ1E1) [B] 6= EQ(−γ2E2) [B], it holds
that
ν(b)(αB; γ2|E2)− ν(w)(αB; γ1|E1)
= α(EQ(−γ2E2) [B]−EQ(−γ1E1) [B])−α
2
2
(γ1∆
Q(−γ1E1)(B)+γ2∆
Q(−γ2E2)(B))+o(α2),
(3.4.3)
for every α ∈ R close to zero.
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Chapter 4
The Partial Equilibrium Pricing
This chapter deals with the existence and uniqueness of a partial equi-
librium price of a contingent claim in our two-agents economy. The discussion
of mutual agreeability in the previous chapter assumed that the number of
units is fixed and the claim is indivisible. If, however, the negotiation between
agents involves both the quantity traded and the price, and if this quantity
is not constrained by quantization, a great deal more can be said about the
outcome of the negotiation. The main advantage is that the methodology of
equilibrium theory can be applied and a unique price-quantity pair singled
out on the basis of the fundamental economic principle of market clearing. We
stress that the agents take the form of the claims as given and do not engage
in any form of optimal design, as is the case in many real-world situations in
insurance, illiquid markets, bulk sales of shares, etc.
We divide this chapter into two sections. In the first one, we introduce
some helpful notation and we define and analyze the utility-based demand
function on a given vector of claims. In the second section, we state the main
theorem of our equilibrium pricing together with a number of related remarks.
Since agents’ acceptance sets depend on every undertaken risky invest-
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ment, it is more realistic for a pricing rule to apply to a vector of claims
instead of a single one. In what follows, we fix a vector of contingent claims,
B = (B1, B2, . . . , Bn) ∈ (L∞)n.
4.1 The Demand Function
In this section, we introduce the notion of the demand function and
analyze some of its properties. First, we define the “restrictions” U i : R
n ×
Rn → R, i ∈ {1, 2} of the value functions uγ1(·|E1) and uγ2(·|E2) (see (2.1.2))
by
U i(α;p) =
{
uγi(α · (B − p)|Ei), α ∈ Rn,
lim supα′→α,α′∈Rn U i(α
′;p), α ∈ Rn \ Rn, p ∈ R
n,
(4.1.1)
for i ∈ {1, 2}, where R denotes the extended set R ∪ {±∞} of real numbers.
In other words, U i(·;p) is the extension of the continuous function U i(·;p)
∣∣∣
Rn
to Rn by upper semi-continuity and gives the indirect utility of agent i when
she holds α units of B, purchased at price p.
Definition 4.1.1. The demand correspondence Zi : Rn → 2R
n
, for the agent
i ∈ {1, 2}, is defined by
Zi(p) = argmax
{
U i(α,p) : α ∈ Rn
}
, p ∈ Rn. (4.1.2)
Intuitively, the elements of Zi(p) give the numbers of units of B that
agent i is willing to purchase at price p (the numbers of units that maximize
her indirect utility).
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For the remainder of this chapter we enforce the following assumption.
Assumption 4.1.2. There exists no α ∈ Rn \ {0} such that α ·B ∼ 0.
In other words, through Assumption 4.1.2 we impose that there is no
linear combination of the claims B1, B2, ..., Bn which can be replicated by the
traded assets.
Before we present some properties of the demand function, we need
to introduce some further notation. We denote by PNA ⊆ Rn the set of all
arbitrage-free price-vectors of the contingent claims B, i.e.,
PNA =
{
EQ[B] : Q ∈Me
}
,
where, as usual, EQ[B] = (EQ[B1], . . . ,EQ[Bn]) ∈ Rn. To simplify the nota-
tion, we introduce two n-dimensional families of measures in Me, parameter-
ized by α ∈ Rn,
Q(α)i = Q(γiα·B−γiEi), α ∈ Rn, i = 1, 2.
We, then, define the following sets
PUi =
{
EQ
(α)
i [B] : α ∈ Rn
}
, for i = 1, 2.
In general, PUi ⊆ PNA, for i = 1, 2. The equality holds when Ei ∼ 0
(see [51], Lemma 7.1). For future use, we define the function ui : Rn → R by
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ui(p) = sup
α∈R¯n
{U i(α;p)}, for i ∈ {1, 2}. Building on the notation of Section
2.4, we also introduce the following two shorthands
wi(α) = ν
(w)(α ·B; γi|Ei)
bi(α) = ν
(b)(α ·B; γi|Ei)
 α ∈ Rn, i ∈ {1, 2} . (4.1.3)
Lemma 4.1.3. For i = 1, 2, wi is strictly convex and bi is strictly concave.
Proof. A change of the probability measure P to P−γiEi can be employed to
justify no loss of generality if we assume that Ei = 0 in this proof. The fact that
wi(·) is convex follows from the convexity of the indifference price. In order
to establish that the convexity is, in fact, strict, we assume, to the contrary,
that there exist α1,α2 ∈ Rn with α1 6= α2 and λ ∈ (0, 1) such that
wi(λα1 + (1− λ)α2) = λwi(α1) + (1− λ)wi(α2).
Equivalently, we then have
ν(w) ((λα1 + (1− λ)α2) ·B; γi) = ν(w)
(
λα1 ·B; γiλ
)
+ ν(w)
(
(1− λ)α2 ·B; γi1−λ
)
Since (γi
λ
)−1 + ( γi
1−λ)
−1 = (γi)−1, we can use Lemma 2.2.9 to conclude that
α1 ·B ∼ α2 ·B, i.e., α ·B ∼ 0, where α = α1 −α2 6= 0 ∈ Rn,
a contradiction with Assumption 4.1.2. A similar argument can be employed
to prove the strict concavity of bi, i ∈ {1, 2}.
Proposition 4.1.4. For i ∈ {1, 2}, the functions ui(·) and Zi(·) have the
following properties
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1. The maximum in (4.1.2) is always attained, i.e., Zi(p) 6= ∅, for all
p ∈ Rn.
2. For p ∈ Rn, we have
Zi(p) = argmax
α∈Rn
{ν(b)(α ·B; γi|Ei)−α · p}. (4.1.4)
3. Either Zi(p) = {α} for some α ∈ Rn or Zi ⊆ Rn \ Rn.
4. Zi(p) = {α} if and only if EQ(α)i [B] = p (in particular, p ∈ PUi ).
Proof.
1. It follows from the fact that the function Zi is upper semi-continuous on
the compact space Rn.
2. It suffices to observe that (2.1.7) implies that
ui(p) = exp{−γi sup
α∈R¯n
(ν(b)(α ·B; γi|Ei)−α · p)}
(
uγi(0|Ei)
)
, (4.1.5)
for all p ∈ Rn.
3. The set Zi(p) is convex, so if it contains a point in Rn and a point
in Rn \ Rn, it must contain infinitely many points in Rn. This is in
contradiction with the strict concavity of bi on Rn.
4. Proposition 2.4.1 states that bi is continuously differentiable on Rn and
that ∇bi(α) = EQ(−α)i [B]. Therefore, ν(b)(α ·B; γi|Ei)−α ·p is a concave
and differentiable function of α ∈ Rn and its derivative is given by
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EQ
(−α)
i [B]−p. Consequently, ν(b)(α·B; γi|Ei)−α·p attains its maximum
on Rn if and only if EQ
(−α)
i [B] = p has a solution α ∈ Rn. In that case,
Zi(p) = {α}.
4.2 Partial Equilibrium Price-Quantity
Using the definition of the demand function for a fixed vector of claims
and the notation introduced above, we are ready to give the definition of the
partial equilibrium price-quantity.
Definition 4.2.1. A pair (p,α) ∈ Rn × Rn is called a partial-equilibrium
price-quantity (PEPQ) if
α ∈ Z1(p) and −α ∈ Z2(p). (4.2.1)
A vector p ∈ Rn for which there exists α ∈ Rn such that (p,α) is a PEPQ is
called a partial-equilibrium price (PEP).
In other words, the PEP is the price-vector of the contingent claim B
at which the quantity that one agent is willing to sell is equal to the quantity
which the other agent is wants to buy.
Taking into account Proposition 4.1.4, we are able to provide the equa-
tion that the equilibrium quantity must satisfy.
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Proposition 4.2.2. A pair (pˆ, αˆ) is a PEPQ if and only if pˆ ∈ PU1 ∩ PU2 ,
α ∈ Rn and
EQ
(αˆ)
1 [B] = EQ
(−αˆ)
2 [B] = pˆ. (4.2.2)
Proof. If (pˆ, αˆ) is a PEPQ, then Zi(pˆ)∩Rn 6= ∅ and, so, by Proposition 4.1.4,
part 3., we must have Zi(pˆ) = {αi}, for some αi ∈ Rn and pˆ ∈ PUi , for i = 1, 2.
By (4.2.1), we have α1 = −α2. The equalities in (5.4.8), with αˆ = α1 follow
directly from part 4. of Proposition 4.1.4.
Conversely, suppose that (5.4.8) holds. Then, by part 4. of Proposition
4.1.4, we have Z1(p) = {αˆ} and Z2(p) = {−αˆ}, which, in turn, implies
(4.2.1).
We have also shown the following result which will be used shortly:
Corollary 4.2.3. A pair (pˆ, αˆ) ∈ (PU1 ∩ PU2 )× Rn is a PEPQ if and only if
w1(αˆ)− b2(αˆ) ≤ w1(α)− b2(α) for any α ∈ Rn, and pˆ = ∇w1(αˆ).
The main result of this section is presented in the following Theorem.
Theorem 4.2.4. Let E1,E2 ∈ L∞, γ1, γ2 > 0 and B ∈ (L∞)n be arbitrary,
and suppose that the Assumption 4.1.2 is satisfied. Then, there exists a unique
partial equilibrium price-quantity (α,p) ∈ Rn × Rn. Moreover, p ∈ PU1 ∩ PU2 .
Proof. If the PEPQ (α,p) exists, then α globally minimizes the strictly con-
cave function w1 − b2, so it must be unique. To establish existence, it will be
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enough to solve the equation ∇f = 0, where f = w1 − b2. Assume, to the
contrary, that ∇f(α) 6= 0, for all α ∈ Rn. The continuity of f implies that,
for each m ∈ N, there exists αm ∈ Bm = {α ∈ Rn :
∑n
i=1 |αi| ≤ m} such that
f(αm) ≤ f(α) for all α ∈ Bm. Thanks to the strict convexity of f and the
fact that ∇f 6= 0 on Bm, we must have ||αm||1 = m, where ||α||1 =
∑n
i=1 |αi|.
In order to obtain a contradiction, it will be enough to show that
lim inf
m→∞
f(αm)
m
> 0. (4.2.3)
Indeed, (4.2.3) would provide the following coercivity condition
lim inf
m→∞
inf
{
f(α)
||α||1
: α ∈ Bm \ {0}
}
> 0,
which, in turn, would guarantee existence of a global minimizer α0 ∈ Rn for
f (see Chapter 1 of [16]), at which ∇f(α0) = 0 holds.
The first step in the proof of (4.2.3) uses the representation given in
part 2 of Proposition 2.2.2 and the risk-measure properties of ν(w)(·; γ|E) to
obtain the following
lim inf
m→∞
f(αm)
m
= lim inf
m→∞
1
m
(
ν(w) (αm ·B − E1; γ1) + ν(w) (−αm ·B − E2; γ2)
)
≥ lim inf
m→∞
1
m
(
ν(w) (αm ·B; γ1)− ||E1||L∞ + ν(w) (−αm ·B; γ2)− ||E2||L∞
)
= lim inf
m→∞
(
ν(w)
(
1
m
αm ·B;mγ1
)
+ ν(w)
(− 1
m
αm ·B;mγ2
) )
.
Any subsequence of N, through which the lim inf above is achieved admits a
further subsequence (mk)k∈N such that the sequence 1mkαmk converges to some
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α0 ∈ Rn with ||α0||1 = 1; indeed, the sequence ( 1mαm)m∈N takes values in the
compact set {α ∈ Rn : ||α||1 = 1}. Proposition 2.2.16 implies that
ν(w)
(
1
mk
αmk ·B;mkγ1
)
→ sup
Q∈Me
EQ[α0 ·B],
and ν(w)
(
− 1
mk
αmk ·B;mkγ2
)
→ − inf
Q∈Me
EQ[α0 ·B],
(4.2.4)
as k →∞. Therefore,
lim inf
m→∞
1
m
f(αm) = sup
Q∈Me
EQ[α0 ·B]− infQ∈Me E
Q[α0 ·B].
It remains to observe that the equality supQ∈Me E
Q[α0·B] = infQ∈Me EQ[α0·B]
cannot hold; if it did, Assumption 4.1.2 would be violated.
Remark 4.2.5. The concept of the partial equilibrium pricing as stated in Def-
inition 4.2.1 has its roots in the classic market clearing equilibrium arguments
(see e.g., [15], Chapter 6 of [61], for the mathematical overview). The above
proof of the existence of the PEPQ (and its uniqueness guaranteed by As-
sumption 4.1.2) differs from the classical scheme in the following sense: the
special properties of the exponential utility and, in particular, the form of
the induced demand function, allow us to derive an explicit expression for the
PEPQ; namely, it is given as the minimizer of the difference w1(α) − b2(α).
Additionally, and unlike the classical approach, such a constructive expression
opens a possibility of efficient numerical computation in many cases of interest.
Remark 4.2.6.
1. When n = 1, the proof above can be simplified considerably; one can
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show that
lim
α→∞
w′1(α) > lim
α→∞
b′2(α) and lim
α→−∞
w′1(α) < lim
α→−∞
b′2(α),
and deduce the existence of the solution of the equation w′1(α) = b
′
2(α)
directly.
In addition, by Remark 3.4.7, we easily get that the quantity
α˜ =
EQ(−γ2E2) [B]− EQ(−γ1E1) [B]
γ1∆Q
(−γ1E1)(B) + γ2∆Q
(−γ2E2)(B)
minimizes the second order approximation of the difference w1(α)−b2(α).
In view of Corollary 4.2.3, we can heuristically consider α˜ as an approx-
imation of the partial equilibrium quantity (PEQ), provided that α˜ is
close to zero.
2. Corollary 3.3.6 and the discussion preceding it show that when γ1
γ2
E1 ∼
E2, the unique PEPQ must be of the form (0,p), where p = EQ
(−γ1E1) [B] =
EQ(−γ2E2) [B] for every B which satisfies the Assumption 4.1.2. In such
cases p should not be interpreted as a price of B, since no transaction
actually occurs. Furthermore, the strict agreement (in the sense of Def-
inition 3.1.1) can then be reached for no contingent claim of the from
α ·B, α ∈ Rn.
Even when γ1
γ2
E1  E2, there might exist claims for which the PEPQ is
of the form (0,p). In fact, PEPQ is of the form (0,p) if and only if
EQ(−γ1E1) [B] = EQ(−γ2E2) [B] (see Proposition 3.4.6). As an example, con-
sider a claim B which is independent of the stochastic process S, as well
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as the two random endowments. The partial equilibrium price is then
simply a certainty equivalent p = E[B] = EQ(−γ1E1) [B] = EQ(−γ2E2) [B].
If a vector of claims B satisfies the Assumption 4.1.2 and its PEPQ is
of the form (0,p), then ν(w)(α · B; γ1|E1) − ν(b)(α · B; γ2|E2) > 0, for
every α ∈ Rn \ {0}, i.e., α ·B /∈ G for all α 6= 0. In other words, any
trade in a nontrivial linear combination α ·B must make at least one of
the agents strictly worse off.
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Chapter 5
Agreement and Equilibrium Under Convex
Capital Requirements
The aim of this chapter is to generalize the concept of agents’ agree-
ment, discussed in previous sections, by allowing a larger class of agents’ ac-
ceptance sets and including more than two agents into the scheme. More
precisely, we suppose that the agents’ acceptance sets are not necessarily in-
duced by utility maximization problems, but instead, we require that they
satisfy some minimal financially rational axioms. These axioms are inspired
by the relatively new and recently widely developed Theory of Convex Risk
Measures. In Appendix B, a short introduction and a summary of the main
results of this theory are provided. We consider the same locally bounded semi-
martingale financial market introduced in the previous chapters and assume
that the agents’ contingent claim valuation is based on their acceptance sets,
in a similar fashion to the case of indifference pricing. We, then, generalize the
notion of agreeable claims, and impose and discuss the necessary assumptions
that lead to the existence and uniqueness of the partial equilibrium price for
a vector of claims.
In Section 5.1, we state the axioms that an agent’s acceptance set should
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satisfy. More precisely, we require that such a set is monotone, convex, contains
zero and does not include non-positive payoffs. An axiom that connects the
acceptance set with the market and the admissible strategies is also imposed
(see axiom Ax4, at page 81). Following the arguments of the utility indifference
pricing, we define the risk measure (induced from the acceptance set) of an
arbitrary payoff to be the minimum amount of money such that, when added
to the payoff, creates an acceptable position. A number of properties of this
measure are also presented.
Section 5.2 is dedicated to the robust representation of the risk measure
in the spirit of Theorem B.0.7. More precisely, we show that the effective do-
main of the corresponding penalty function is included in Ma (the absolutely
continuous martingale probability measures). Similarly, as in the case of expo-
nential utility, we define an equivalence relation (with respect to risk) among
the essentially bounded payoffs. Using this relation, we introduce the property
of risk-strict convexity of an acceptance set; roughly speaking, an acceptance
set is risk-strictly convex if for every pair of acceptable claims, which do not
belong to the same equivalence class, every convex combination of these claims
results in strictly less risk. Imposing this assumption, we are able to restrict
ourselves only to equivalent martingale measures.
In Section 5.3, we attempt to generalize the notion of agreement by
allowing more than two agents and considering a vector of claims, instead of a
single one. Given a vector of contingent claims B = (B1, B2, ..., Bn), we first
define its set of allocations, i.e., the set of matrices that represent the feasible
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ways to share the units of claims in B among the agents. Then, we say that
the pair of B and its allocation a is a mutually-agreeable claim-allocation if
there is a price vector p at which the sharing of B according to allocation a
is acceptable for every agents. In the last part of Section 5.3, we connect this
generalized agreement notion with the so-called inf-convolution risk measure.
Finally, in Section 5.4, we deal with the market clearing equilibrium
pricing arguments. We fix a vector of claims B and define the agent’s demand
function in a similar way as in Chapter 4. By imposing a strict convexity
assumption on the agent’s acceptance set, we show that the induced risk mea-
sure is differentiable as a function of units of the claims in B. In turn, we
provide a formula for its gradient. Using these results, we are able to exhibit
some properties of the demand function such as monotonicity and continuity.
In subsection 5.4.2, we include the definition of the partial equilibrium price-
allocation (PEPA); a price vector p is called a partial equilibrium price if the
sum of agents’ demand functions at p is zero. The corresponding allocation,
determined by the demand functions, is called a partial equilibrium allocation
(as mentioned in the Introduction, the term allocation is chosen instead of the
term quantity to indicate the possibility of the participation of more than two
agents). By imposing two necessary assumptions, we establish the existence
and uniqueness of the PEPA.
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5.1 Acceptance Sets and the Market
In this section, we adopt the market setting introduced in page 12, and
consider a financial agent who invests in this market by creating self-financing
portfolios. Since we do not restrict ourselves to exponential utility maximizers,
we consider a set of admissible strategies different than the set Θ defined in
(2.1.1). First, we relax Assumption 2.1.1 by replacing it by the following
weaker one.
Assumption 5.1.1. Me 6= ∅.
We call a strategy h ∈ L(S) admissible if the stochastic integral (h ·S)t
is uniformly bounded from below, i.e., the set of admissible strategies is given
by
H = {h ∈ L(S) : ∃c ∈ R such that c ≤ (h · S)t, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]} (5.1.1)
The gains process obtained by investing the initial wealth x ∈ R according to
a strategy h ∈H is denoted by Xx,ht , i.e.,
Xx,ht = x+ (h · S)t = x+
∫ t
0
hu dSu, t ∈ [0, T ]. (5.1.2)
In addition, X(x) =
{
Xx,hT : h ∈H
}
is called the set of admissible terminal
gains with initial wealth x, for x ∈ R.
In what follows, we will use the notations X =
⋃
x∈R
X(x) and X∞ =
X∩L∞. We, also, define the set R = {X ∈ X : −X ∈ X}, i.e., X ∈ R if there
exists x ∈ R and h ∈H such that X = x+ (h · S)T and (h · S)t is uniformly
bounded. Note that R ⊆ L∞.
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Remark 5.1.2. The lower bound on the losses of the admissible strategies is
imposed in order to avoid the pathologies that the so-called doubling strate-
gies create. Moreover, Assumption 5.1.1 excludes the existence of arbitrage
opportunities in the market of traded assets S (see [30], Corollary 1.2). Note
also that X ∈ X∞ does not imply that −X ∈ X, since there exist admissible
strategies such that (h · S)T ∈ L∞ and (−h · S)t is not uniformly bounded
from below.
Given the financial market S and the set of admissible strategies H ,
we assume that each agent’s risk preferences, investment goals and random
endowment are incorporated in a set A˜ ⊆ L0(F), called the acceptance set . In
fact, A˜ contains the discounted net wealth of all the investment positions the
agent is willing to undertake at time t = 0. Following the literature on convex
risk measures, we assume that A˜ satisfies the following axioms.
Ax1. For B,C ∈ L0(F), if B ∈ A˜ and B ≤ C, then C ∈ A˜. If also B,C ∈ L∞,
then B ≤ C, P−a.s. and B ∈ A˜ implies that C ∈ A˜.
Ax2. A˜ is convex.
Ax3. A˜ ∩ L0−(F) = {0}.
Ax4. For every B ∈ A˜, we have that B − (h · S)T ∈ A˜, for every h ∈H .
A direct consequence of axiom Ax4. is the following property.
If there exists X ∈ X(x) such that B +X ∈ A˜, then x+B ∈ A˜. (5.1.3)
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As discussed in Appendix B, axiom Ax1 simply states that every investment
with payoff higher than the payoff of an acceptable claim is also acceptable.
Axiom Ax2 reflects the fact that diversified portfolios of acceptable invest-
ments should also be acceptable, while Axiom Ax3 means that the status quo
(i.e., undertaking no investments) is an acceptable position and that the in-
vestments with non-positive, different than zero payoffs are not acceptable.
Finally, axiom Ax4 is the one that connects the market to the agent’s accept-
able positions. If B ∈ A˜, the position B−X +x belongs in A˜, since the agent
can use x to replicate X and add it to B − X. Similarly, if B + X ∈ A˜ for
some replicable position X, the payoff B plus the replication cost of X should
also belong to A˜.
An example of an acceptance set that satisfies these axioms is the set
Aγ(E) defined in (2.1.4).
In what follows, we denote by A the set of essentially bounded accept-
able claims, i.e., A = A˜∩L∞. Given the acceptance set A˜, we call the mapping
ρA : L∞ → R¯, defined by
ρA(B) = inf{m ∈ R : m+B ∈ A˜}, for every B ∈ L∞, (5.1.4)
the agent’s convex capital requirement . It follows (see B.0.5) that ρA(·) is
convex, decreasing and cash invariant (see also Definition B.0.3 for details).
By axioms Ax1 and Ax2, we get that ρA(0) = 0. Also, thanks to the in-
equality−‖B‖L∞ ≤ B ≤ ‖B‖L∞ and axiom Ax1, ρA(B) ∈ [−‖B‖L∞ , ‖B‖L∞ ] ⊆
R for every B ∈ L∞.
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It is, also, straightforward to get that A ⊆ {B ∈ L∞ : ρA(B) ≤ 0}. If,
in addition, the acceptance set A˜ satisfies the following closure property, the
inverse inclusion also holds (see, also, Remark B.0.6).
The set
{
λ ∈ [0, 1] : λm+ (1− λ)B ∈ A˜
}
is closed in [0, 1], (5.1.5)
for every m ∈ R+ and B ∈ L∞.
Property (5.1.5) holds, in particular, if A˜ ∩ V is closed for any finite-
dimensional subspace V ⊆ L∞.
Summing up, we have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 5.1.3. If an acceptance set A˜ satisfies the axioms Ax1-Ax4 and
property (5.1.5), the mapping ρA : L∞ → R defined in (5.1.4) is a convex risk
measure, for which ρA(0) = 0. Furthermore, the intersection A = A˜∩L∞ can
be recovered from ρA(·) through the equality A = {B ∈ L∞ : ρA(B) ≤ 0}.
In what follows, with a slight abuse of terminology, when we refer the
term acceptance set we will refer to the set A = A˜ ∩ L∞, for A˜ that satisfies
Ax1 -Ax4.
Remark 5.1.4. Similar definitions of the convex capital requirement have been
given in [37] (page 207) and [41]. In the former, a given acceptance set A is
related to the market through a larger acceptance set Aˆ, defined as
Aˆ = {B ∈ L∞ : ∃X ∈ X(0), A ∈ A such that X +B ≥ A,P− a.s.} (5.1.6)
In our case, (5.1.3) yields that Aˆ = A, which means that the definition of the
acceptance set A has already taken the market into account.
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In [41], the authors define the generalized capital requirement by
ρˆA(B) = inf {m ∈ R : ∃X ∈ X(m) such that X +B ∈ A} .
If the acceptance set A˜ satisfies the axioms Ax1 -Ax4, it is straightforward to
show that ρA(B) = ρˆA(B).
5.2 The Robust Representation
If we suppose that the set A is weak-*closed (i.e., closed in the topology
σ(L∞,L1)), the convex risk measure ρA(·) admits a robust representation in
the sense of [6], [28] and [36] (see Theorem B.0.7) and, also, satisfies the
property (5.1.5). Axiom Ax4 provides some further information about the
penalty function and, in particular, about its effective domain, denoted by
MA.
Proposition 5.2.1. If A is a weak-*closed acceptance set, then ρA admits a
robust representation of the following form
ρA(B) = sup
Q∈Ma
{EQ[−B]− αA(Q)}, (5.2.1)
for every B ∈ L∞, where αA(Q) = sup
B∈A
{EQ[−B]}, i.e., MA ⊆ Ma. Also, the
supremum is attained by a measure (possibly not unique), denoted by Q(B)A .
Proof. It is enough to show that for every Q /∈Ma, αA(Q) = +∞.
For every such Q, there exists an admissible terminal wealth X ∈ X(x),
such that EQ[X] > x, i.e., there exists a portfolio h ∈ H , such that (h · S)t
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is uniformly bounded from below and EQ[(h · S)T ] > 0 (see Theorem 5.6 in
[30]). Then, for every k ∈ N, we define Bk = −((h ·S)T ∧ k), which belongs to
L∞. Hence, Bk + (h · S)T = ((h · S)T − k)1{(h·S)T≥k} ≥ 0, which means that
Bk + (h · S)T ∈ A˜ for every k ∈ N. Also, by (5.1.3) we have that λBk ∈ A,
for all λ > 0. Hence, αA(Q) ≥ EQ[−λBk], for every k ∈ N. Letting k go to
infinity, we get from the monotone convergence theorem that
αA(Q) ≥ λEQ[(h · S)T ].
If we let λ go to infinity, we conclude.
Note that since ρA(0) = 0, minQ∈MA
{αA(Q)} = 0.
Corollary 5.2.2. If A is a weak-*closed acceptance set, ρA(·) satisfies the
following replication invariance property: For every B ∈ L∞ and every C ∈ R
such that C = x+ (h · S)T , P−a.s., for some x ∈ R and h ∈H, it holds that
ρA(B + C) = ρA(B)− x.
Below we give a definition (analogous to Definition 2.1.2) of equivalence
classes with respect to risk.
Definition 5.2.3. We call two random variables B,C ∈ L∞ equivalent with
respect to their risk, and we write B ∼ C, if B − C ∈ R.
The condition B ∼ C means that the claims with payoffs B and C
carry the same unhedgeable risk. B ∼ C also implies that for every λ ∈ [0, 1],
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ρA(λB + (1 − λ)C) = λρA(B) + (1 − λ)ρA(C). This is because, B ∼ C is
equivalent to the existence of some x ∈ R and h ∈ H such that B − C =
x+ (h · S)T , P−a.s.. By Corollary 5.2.2, we get that
ρA(λB + (1− λ)C) = ρA(C + λx+ (λh · S)T ) = ρA(C)− λx
and also
λρA(B) + (1− λ)ρA(C) = λρA(C)− λx+ (1− λ)ρA(C) = ρA(C)− λx.
On the other hand, if B  C, convex combinations of the payoffs B and
C may lead to reduction of risk. If any such combination of claims (which do
not belong in the same equivalence class) reduces the risk, the corresponding
acceptance set A is called risk-strictly convex.
Definition 5.2.4. A weak-*closed acceptance set A is called risk-strictly con-
vex if for every B,C ∈ A with B  C, it holds that for every λ ∈ (0, 1) there
exists a random variable E ∈ L∞+ such that, Q(λB+(1−λ)C)A (E > 0) > 0, and
λB + (1− λ)C − E ∈ A.
Proposition 5.2.5. Let A be a weak-*closed acceptance set. Then, A is risk-
strictly convex if and only if its induced risk measure ρA is strictly convex up
to the claims which do not belong to the same equivalence class.
Proof. We first assume that A is risk-strictly convex. For arbitrarily chosen
B,C ∈ L∞ such that B  C, we have that B+ρA(B), C+ρA(C) ∈ A. Hence,
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for every λ ∈ (0, 1), there exists E ∈ L∞+ such that Q(λB+(1−λ)C)A (E > 0) > 0
and
λB + (1− λ)C + λρA(B) + (1− λ)ρA(C)− E ∈ A.
This implies that ρA(λB + (1− λ)C − E) ≤ λρA(B) + (1− λ)ρA(C). Then,
ρA(λB + (1− λ)C) = EQ
(λB+(1−λ)C)
A [−λB − (1− λ)C]− αA(Q(λB+(1−λ)C)A )
< EQ
(λB+(1−λ)C)
A [−λB − (1− λ)C + E]− αA(Q(λB+(1−λ)C)A )
≤ sup
Q∈MA
{EQ[−λB − (1− λ)C + E]− αA(Q)} = ρA(λB + (1− λ)C − E)
≤ λρA(B) + (1− λ)ρA(C).
On the other hand, if for every B,C ∈ A such that B  C and every
λ ∈ (0, 1) we have that
ρA(λB + (1− λ)C) < λρA(B) + (1− λ)ρA(C),
it is enough to consider as the corresponding E the positive real number
−ρA(λB + (1− λ)C), for which λB + (1− λ)C − E ∈ A.
Under the assumption that the acceptance set A is risk-strictly convex,
we can say a bit more about the effective domain of the penalty function of
the induced risk measure, MA.
Proposition 5.2.6. If an acceptance set A is weak-*closed and risk-strict
convex, then MA ⊆Me.
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Proof. Assume that there exists B ∈ L∞ such that Q(B)A /∈ Me, i.e., there
exists a measurable set A ∈ F such that P(A) > 0 and Q(B)A (A) = 0. From the
equation
αA(Q(B)A ) = sup
C∈L∞
{EQ(B)A [−C]− ρA(C)},
which follows from the definition of αA, we get that
ρA(B + k1A) ≥ ρA(B),
for all k ∈ R. Furthermore, the monotonicity of ρA implies that ρA(B+k1A) =
ρA(B) for all k ∈ R+. By the risk-strictness assumption, the latter equality
yields that B + k1A ∼ B for every k ∈ R+, i.e., k1A ∼ 0, i.e., there exist
x ∈ R and h ∈ H such that k1A = kx + (kh · S)T ∈ R. Again by the
equality ρA(B + k1A) = ρA(B) and Corollary 5.2.2 we get that x = 0, and
hence 1A = (h · S)T , which contradicts the non-arbitrage assumption.
We recall the definition of the sensitivity of a risk measure, given in
[37], page 173.
Definition 5.2.7. A risk measure ρ is called sensitive if ρ(−B) > ρ(0) for
every B ∈ L∞+ \{0}.
The fact that the minimizers of the penalty function αA(·), belong
in Pe(P) implies that the risk measure ρA(·) is sensitive. Indeed, from the
characterization (5.2.1),
ρA(−B) ≥ EQ
(0)
A [B]− αA(Q(0)A ) = EQ
(0)
A [B] > 0.
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Similarly, we get that ρA(B) < 0.
Another direct consequence for a risk-strictly convex acceptance set is
the following proposition.
Proposition 5.2.8. Let B ∈ L∞ such that B /∈ R. Let ρA be the risk measure
of a weak-*closed, risk-strictly convex acceptance set A. Then,
ρA(B) + ρA(−B) > 0.
In particular, A ∩ (−A) = X(0) ∩ R.
Proof. For any such B, ρA(B) +B ∈ A and ρA(−B)−B ∈ A. By assumption
(since 2B /∈ R), there exists E ∈ L∞+ \{0} such that
1
2
(ρA(B) + ρA(−B))− E ∈ A.
Hence, 1
2
(ρA(B) + ρA(−B))− ρA(−E) ≥ 0 and by monotonicity of ρA, we get
that ρA(B) + ρA(−B) > 0.
The last statement then follows by Corollary 5.2.2.
5.3 A Generalized Notion of Agreement
The aim of this section is to generalize the notion of mutually agreeable
claims in the following sense:
• The number of agents is I ≥ 2.
• A vector of claims is considered instead of a single one.
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• The agents value claims using acceptance sets that satisfy axioms Ax1 -
Ax4.
• The agents may have access to different markets.
Before we state the corresponding definition, we introduce some further
notation.
We suppose that each agent i has access to a sub-market Si ⊆ S, i.e.,
she is allowed to trade (has access to) a vector of di + 1 ≤ d+ 1 traded assets
(S
(0)
t ;S
(i1)
t , . . . , S
(idi )
t )t∈[0,T ], where ik ∈ {1, 2, ..., d} and ik 6= il for k 6= l. Note
that we assume that the nume´raire S(0) is accessible to each agent. In order to
take the whole market into account, we suppose that S =
⋃I
i=1 Si. Also note
that the Assumption 5.1.1 implies that
Mia = {Q P : Si is a local martingale under Q} 6= ∅
∀i = 1, 2, ..., I, since Ma ⊆ Mia. We, then, endow all agents with the corre-
sponding to Si set of admissible terminal gains Xi (terminal value of uniformly
bounded from below gain processes) and an acceptance set A˜i which satisfies
the axioms Ax1 -Ax4. The induced risk measure ρAi is denoted by ρi and Mi
stands for the effective domain of the corresponding penalty function αi, i.e.,
the set MAi , for every i = 1, 2, ..., I.
If we further assume that the intersection A˜i ∩ L∞, denoted by Ai, is
a weak-*closed set, the induced risk measure ρi = ρAi admits the following
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robust representation
ρi(B) = sup
Q∈Mi
{EQ[−B]− αi(Q)}, (5.3.1)
where Mi ⊆Mia for all i.
We use the notation Q(B)i for the attained supremum in (5.3.1) for
B ∈ L∞ and for every i = 1, 2, ..., I.
For vector of claims in (L∞)n, n ∈ N, we call a matrix (ai,k) = a ∈ RI×n
an n-allocation or simply an allocation, if
∑I
i=1 ai,k = 0 for all k = 1, 2, ..., n.
For convenience, we denote by ai the vector (ai,k)
n
k=1 ∈ Rn (the number of
claims agent i holds according the allocation a). The set of allocations is
denoted by F, i.e.,
F = {a ∈ RI×n such that
I∑
i=1
ai = (0, 0, ..., 0)}. (5.3.2)
We are, now, ready to give a general definition of the notion of agree-
ment.
Definition 5.3.1. The pair (B,a) ∈ (L∞)n × F of a vector of claims and an
allocation is called mutually agreeable if there exists a (price) vector p ∈ Rn
such that ai ·B − ai · p ∈ Ai, for all i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Intuitively, if a pair (B,a) is mutually agreeable, all agents are willing
to allocate the claims in B according to the allocation a at price p, where
“willing” means that the investment position ai ·B − ai · p does not increase
the i−agent’s risk.
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Remark 5.3.2. The Definition 3.1.1 of mutually agreeable claims can be in-
terpreted as a special case of the above definition, where I = 2, n = 1,
Ai = Aγi(Ei) and a = (−1, 1).
For every allocation a, we define the set
Ga = {B ∈ (L∞)n : (B,a) is mutually agreeable}.
Note that G−a = −Ga.
We also set Rˆa = {B ∈ (L∞)n : ai ·B ∈ Ri, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., I} for a ∈ F.
In the spirit of Proposition 3.1.6, we state the following properties of the set
Ga.
Proposition 5.3.3. For every allocation a ∈ F, Ga is convex. If, also, Ai is
weak*-closed and risk-strictly convex for every i = 1, 2, ..., I, then
Ga ∩ (−Ga) ⊆ Rˆa,
for all a ∈ F.
Proof. The convexity follows directly from the convexity of Ai’s. For the
second statement, suppose that B ∈ Ga ∩ (−Ga), i.e., there exist p, pˆ ∈ Rn
such that ai ·B−ai ·p ∈ Ai and −ai ·B+ai · pˆ ∈ Ai, for all i. The convexity
of Ai then implies that
1
2
ai · (pˆ− p) ∈ Ai, which yields that ai · (pˆ− p) ≤ 0,
for all i = 1, 2, ..., I. Since
∑I
i=1 ai = 0, we conclude that for every agent
ai · p = ai · pˆ. From this equality and the acceptance conditions above, we
get that ρi(ai ·B) ≤ −ai · p and also ρi(−ai ·B) ≤ ai · p for all i. But in
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this case ρi(ai ·B) + ρi(−ai ·B) ≤ 0, which means (thanks to the risk-strict
convexity of ρi) that ai ·B ∈ Ri for all i, i.e., B ∈ Rˆa.
Another useful notion in this concept is the inf-convolution of risk mea-
sures, first introduced in [9].
Definition 5.3.4. The inf-convolution of the risk measures ρ1, ρ2, ..., ρI is the
mapping ♦ρ : L∞ → R ∪ {−∞}, defined by
♦ρ(C) = inf
B1,B2,...,BI−1∈L∞
{
I−1∑
i=1
ρi(Bi) + ρI(C − (B1 +B2 + ....+BI−1))
}
,
(5.3.3)
for C ∈ L∞.
In what follows, we denote by M the intersection
⋂I
i=1Mi and we im-
pose the following assumption.
Assumption 5.3.5. M 6= ∅.
Since S =
⋃I
i=1 Si we have that
⋂I
i=1M
i
e = Me. Hence, if Ai’s are
risk-strictly convex, it holds that M ⊆ Me and, hence, Assumption 5.3.5 is a
stronger version of Assumption 5.1.1.
The following proposition is a slight generalization of Theorem 3.6 in
[10], where the case of I = 2 is addressed. The proof when I ≥ 2 is similar
and, hence, omitted.
Proposition 5.3.6. Under Assumption 5.3.5 and if Ai is weak-*closed for
every i = 1, 2, ..., I, the map ♦ρ : L∞ → R is a convex risk measure with
penalty function h(Q) =
∑I
i=1 αi(Q) whose effective domain is M.
93
Definition 5.3.7. We say that the agents are in Pareto-optimal condition or
in Pareto equilibrium if ♦ρ(0) = 0.
In other words, the Pareto-optimal condition implies that there is no
transaction that can strictly decrease the sum of the agent’s risk measures,
i.e., there is no transaction that strictly improves their risk exposure.
Below, we state a characterization of the Pareto-optimal condition in
terms of the minimizers of the penalty functions αi.
Proposition 5.3.8. The agents are in a Pareto-optimal condition if and only
if Q(0)i = Q
(0)
j for every i, j = 1, 2, ..., I.
Proof. We observe that
♦ρ(0) = sup
Q∈M
{−h(Q)}
= sup
Q∈M
{−
I∑
i=1
αi(Q)} = − infQ∈M{
I∑
i=1
αi(Q)} ≤ 0.
and the equality holds if and only if αi’s have a common minimizer.
The following proposition states that if the agents are in Pareto-optimal
condition, i.e., when ♦ρ(0) = 0, the risk-strict convexity assumption implies
that the transaction of any non-replicable claim results in increased risk for at
least one of the agents involved in this transaction.
Proposition 5.3.9. Assume that Ai are weak-*closed and risk-strictly convex
for all i = 1, 2, .., I and suppose that ♦ρ(0) = 0. For any claims B1, B2, ..., BI−1
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in L∞, it holds that
I−1∑
i=1
ρi(Bi) + ρI(−
I−1∑
i=1
Bi) = 0
if and only if Bi ∈ Ri for all i = 1, 2, ..., I, where BI = −
∑I−1
i=1 Bi.
Proof. Assume that there exists k ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} such that Bk /∈ Rk. Then,
by the strict convexity assumption, ∀λ ∈ (0, 1) there exists E ∈ L∞+ \{0} such
that ρk(λBk − E) ≤ λρk(Bk). This implies that ρk(λBk) < λρk(Bk). Note
that ρi(λBi)− λρi(Bi) ≤ 0, ∀i = 1, 2, ..., I. Hence,
I∑
i=1
ρi(λBi) < λ
I∑
i=1
ρi(Bi) = 0,
which contradicts the assumption ♦ρ(0) = 0.
On the other hand, if Bi ∈ Ri for all i = 1, 2, ..., I, then
ρi(Bi) = −ρi(−Bi).
Hence, if
∑I
i=1 ρi(Bi) > 0, we have that
∑I
i=1 ρi(−Bi) < 0, which also contra-
dicts the assumption ♦ρ(0) = 0.
Corollary 5.3.10. Suppose that Q(0)i = Q
(0)
j for every i, j = 1, 2, ..., I. Then,
for B ∈ (L∞)n and a ∈ F, if B ∈ Ga, it holds that ai · B ∈ Ri, for every
i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Proof. The fact that B ∈ Ga yields that there exists a price vector p such
that ai · B − ai · p ∈ Ai, for all i. This implies that
∑I
i=1 ρi(ai · B) ≤ 0,
which by the hypothesis and Proposition 5.3.9 yields that ai ·B ∈ Ri for all
i = 1, 2, ..., I.
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Example 5.3.11. Suppose that we adopt the exponential utility setup of
Chapter 3 for every agent i, where by γi and Ei we denote the agents’ risk
aversion coefficients and random endowments, respectively. Then, we can
conclude by following the same lines as in the proof of Proposition 3.3.5 that
exponential utility maximizers are in a Pareto-optimal condition if and only if
γi
γj
Ei ∼ Ej for all i, j = 1, 2, ..., I.
5.4 The Partial Equilibrium Price Allocation
Having introduced the setup of I agents, their acceptance sets and sets
of admissible terminal gains, we can establish a partial equilibrium pricing for
a fixed vector of claimsB ∈ (L∞)n. We start with the demand correspondence
for B of the agent i.
5.4.1 The demand function
For every agent i, and for the fixed vector B ∈ (L∞)n, we give the
following generalization of Definition 4.1.1.
Definition 5.4.1. For the agent i, i = 1, 2, ..., I, the demand correspondence
of the vector of claims B, Zi : Rn → 2R¯n is defined by
Zi(p) = argmin
a∈R¯n
{ρi(a ·B − a · p)} = argmin
a∈R¯n
{ρi(a ·B) + a · p} (5.4.1)
In other words, Zi(p) gives the vectors of units of B that the agent i is
willing (in terms of risk minimization) to buy/sell at price p. From Definition
5.4.1, it follows that the differentiability of the mapping a 7→ ρi(a ·B), a ∈ Rn
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is an important issue. For this, we need the following definition, which is a
weaker version of the risk-strict convexity.
Definition 5.4.2. Let A be a weak-*closed acceptance set and B ∈ (L∞)n
a vector of claims. We call A strictly convex with respect to B if for every
λ ∈ (0, 1) and every a, δ ∈ Rn and m, k ∈ R such that a 6= δ and a ·
B + m, δ · B + k ∈ A, there exists a random variable E ∈ L∞+ , such that
Q((λa+(1−λ)δ)·B)A (E > 0) > 0 and
λ(a ·B +m) + (1− λ)(δ ·B + k)− E ∈ A.
Following the proof of Proposition 5.2.5, we can show that an accep-
tance set Ai is strictly convex with respect to B if and only if the function
Rn 3 a 7→ ρi(a ·B) ∈ R is strictly convex. In fact, it is also differentiable in
Rn. For the proof of this argument, we need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.4.3. Let i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} and B = (B1, B2, ..., Bn) ∈ (L∞)n be a
vector of claims for which there is no a ∈ Rn such that a ·B ∈ Ri. If Ai is
weak-*closed and strictly convex with respect to B, it holds that
lim
ak→+∞
EQ
(a·B)
i [−Bk] = sup
Q∈Mi
{EQ[−Bk]} = sup
δ∈Rn
{EQ(δ·B)i [−Bk]} (5.4.2)
and
lim
ak→−∞
EQ
(a·B)
i [−Bk] = infQ∈Mi{E
Q[−Bk]} = inf
δ∈Rn
{EQ(δ·B)i [−Bk]}, (5.4.3)
for all a = (a1, a2, ..., an) ∈ Rn and k = 1, 2, ..., n.
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Proof. Without loss of generality, we assume that k = 1. Note that by con-
vexity of ρi, the ratio
ρi(a·B)
a1
is an increasing function of a1 > 0 and, hence, its
limit as a1 → +∞ exists (in R¯). We claim that
lim
a1→+∞
ρi(a ·B)
a1
≥ sup
Q∈Mi
{EQ[−B1]}. (5.4.4)
Indeed,
lim
a1→+∞
ρi(a ·B)
a1
= sup
a1∈R+
ρi(a ·B)
a1
= sup
a1∈R+
sup
Q∈Mi
{
EQ[−(a ·B)]
a1
− αi(Q)
a1
}
= sup
Q∈Mi
sup
a1∈R+
{
EQ[−(a ·B)]
a1
− αi(Q)
a1
}
= sup
Q∈Mi
sup
a1∈R+
{
EQ[−B1] +
EQ[−∑nj=2 aiBi]− αi(Q)
a1
}
≥ sup
Q∈Mi
sup
a1∈R+
{
EQ[−B1] +
−∑nj=2 |ai|||Bi||∞ − αi(Q)
a1
}
= sup
Q∈Mi
{EQ[−B1]}.
Also, from the inequality ρi(a·B)
a1
+ 1
a1
EQ
(a·B)
i [(a ·B)] ≤ 0, which holds for all
(a2, a3, ..., an) ∈ Rn−1 and a1 > 0, we get that
ρi(a ·B)
a1
≤ EQ(a·B)i [−B1] + 1
a1
EQ
(a·B)
i [−
n∑
j=2
aiBi]
≤ EQ(a·B)i [−B1] +
∑n
j=2 |ai|||Bi||∞
a1
.
Hence, lim
a1→+∞
ρi(a·B)
a1
≤ lim
a1→+∞
EQ
(a·B)
i [−B1]. Hence, by (5.4.4) we get that
lim
a1→+∞
EQ
(a·B)
i [−B1] = sup
Q∈Mi
{EQ[−B1]}.
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It is left to recall that Q(δ·B)i ∈Mi for all δ ∈ Rn.
The proof of the equality (5.4.3) follows the same lines.
For every vector of claims B ∈ (L∞)n and for every agent i, we define
the set
Pi(B) = {EQ
(a·B)
i [B] : a ∈ Rn} ⊆ Rn. (5.4.5)
Note that Lemma 5.4.3 implies, in particular, that sup{Pi(B)} = sup
Q∈Mi
{EQ[−B]},
for every B ∈ L∞.
Proposition 5.4.4. Let i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} and B = (B1, B2, ..., Bn) ∈ (L∞)n
be a vector of claims for which there is no a ∈ Rn such that a · B ∈ Ri.
If Ai is weak-*closed and strictly convex with respect to B, then the function
a 7→ ρi(a ·B) is differentiable for every a ∈ Rn and ∇ρi(a ·B) = EQ
(a·B)
i [−B],
i.e.,
∂
∂ak
ρi(a ·B) = EQ
(a·B)
i [−Bk], (5.4.6)
for every k = 1, 2, ..., n and a ∈ Rn.
Proof. According to Proposition I.5.3 in [33], we need to show that EQ
(a·B)
i [−B]
is the unique subgradient of the function δ 3 Rn 7→ ρi(δ · B) ∈ R at a =
(a1, a2, ..., an) ∈ Rn, i.e., if for some a∗ = (a∗1, a∗2, ..., a∗n) ∈ Rn it holds that
ρi(δ ·B) ≥ ρi(a ·B)− a∗ · (a− δ), ∀δ ∈ Rn, (5.4.7)
then a∗ = EQ
(a·B)
i [−B].
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Assume that a∗ satisfies (5.4.7) and a∗ 6= EQ(a·B)i [−B]. Suppose, first,
that −a∗ ∈ Pi(B), i.e., that there exists δˆ ∈ Rn such that δˆ 6= a and a∗ =
EQ
(δˆ·B)
i [−B]. For δ = δˆ in (5.4.7) we get
ρi(δˆ ·B) + EQ
(δˆ·B)
i [δˆ ·B] ≥ ρi(a ·B) + EQ
(δˆ·B)
i [a ·B].
Note, however, that
ρi(a ·B) ≥ EQ
(δˆ·B)
i [−a ·B]− αi(Q(δˆ·B)i )
= EQ
(δˆ·B)
i [−a ·B] + ρi(δˆ ·B) + EQ
(δˆ·B)
i [δˆ ·B],
and the equality holds if and only if the measure Q(δˆ·B)i is a maximizer of the
difference EQ[−a ·B]− αi(Q). But this implies that
1
2
(ρi(a ·B) + ρi(δˆ ·B)) = ρi
(
(δˆ + a) ·B
2
)
,
which contradicts the assumption of strict convexity.
It is left to show that if a∗ ∈ Rn satisfies (5.4.7), then −a∗ ∈ Pi(B).
We argue by contradiction and assume that this is not the case. By Lemma
5.4.3 this means that there exists l = 1, 2, ..., n such that a∗l ≥ sup
Q∈Mi
{EQ[−Bl]}
or a∗l ≤ infQ∈Mi{E
Q[−Bl]}. Without loss of generality, suppose that the former
holds and that l = 1. Then, applying (5.4.7) for δ = a˜ = (a1 + , a2, a3, ..., an),
where  > 0, yields that
ρi(a˜ ·B) +  infQ∈Mi{E
Q[B1]} ≥ ρi(a ·B).
But this contradicts that
ρi(a ·B) ≥ EQ
(a˜·B)
i [−a ·B]− αi(Q(a˜·B)i )
= ρi(a˜ ·B) + EQ
(a˜·B)
i [B1] > ρi(a˜ ·B) +  infQ∈Mi{E
Q[B1]}.
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This completes the proof.
Remark 5.4.5. If for B ∈ (L∞)n there is no a ∈ Rn such that a ·B ∈ Ri and if
Ai is strictly convex with respect to B, we can restrict ourselves only to prices
which belong to Pi(B), for the specification of the corresponding demand
Zi(p). This is because by its definition, the demand correspondence, Zi(p),
consists of the solutions, a, of the equation −∇ρi(a·B) = EQ(a·B)i [B] = p. For
p ∈ Pi(B), the mapping Zi(p). In fact a function, i.e., Zi(p) is a singleton.
Indeed, if we assume that for some price vector pˆ, there exist ζˆ, ζ˜ ∈ Rn such
that ζˆ 6= ζ˜ and EQ(ζˆ·B) [B] = EQ(ζ˜·B) [B] = pˆ, then
ρi(Zi(pˆ) ·B) + Zi(pˆ) · pˆ = ρi(ζˆ ·B) + ζˆ · pˆ = ρi(ζ˜ ·B) + ζ˜ · pˆ.
Thanks to the strict convexity of ρi, for every λ ∈ (0, 1), we have that
ρi((λζˆ + (1− λ)ζ˜) ·B) + (λζˆ + (1− λ)ζ˜) · pˆ < ρi(Zi(pˆ) ·B) + Zi(pˆ) · pˆ.
The last inequality contradicts the fact that
ρi(Zi(pˆ) ·B) + Zi(pˆ) · pˆ ≤ ρi(a ·B) + a ·B,
which holds for every a ∈ Rn.
Proposition 5.4.6. Let i ∈ {1, 2, ..., I} and B ∈ (L∞)n be a vector of claims
for which there is no a ∈ Rn such that a ·B ∈ Ri. If Ai is weak-*closed and
strictly convex with respect to B, then the demand function Zi is continuous
in Pi(B) and satisfies the monotonicity property
(Zi(p1)− Zi(p2)) · (p1 − p2) < 0,
for every p1,p2 ∈ Pi(B) with p1 6= p2.
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Proof. The continuity is a direct application of the Berge’s Maximum Theorem
(see, for instance, Theorem 17.31 in [1]). From the definition of the demand
function, we have that
ρi(Zi(pj) ·B) + Zi(pj) · pj < ρi(a ·B) + a · pj
for every a ∈ Rn with a 6= Zi(pj), for j = 1, 2. Note also that Zi(p1) 6= Zi(p2)
since Zi(pj) is the solution aˆ of the equation pj = EQ
(aˆ·B)
i [B]. Thus,
ρi(Zi(p1) ·B)− ρi(Zi(p2) ·B) + (Zi(p1)− Zi(p2)) · p1 < 0
and
ρi(Zi(p2) ·B)− ρi(Zi(p1) ·B)− (Zi(p1)− Zi(p2)) · p2 < 0
By adding the above inequalities we conclude.
5.4.2 The equilibrium pricing
Given our fixed vector of claims B, if its price is given by vector p, each
agent sells/buys the units of B that minimizes her risk. As in the classical
market clearing, we follow the ideas stated in Section 4.2 to define a partial
equilibrium price for B.
Definition 5.4.7. We say that the pair (p,a) ∈ ⋂Ii=1 Pi(B) × F is a partial
equilibrium price allocation (PEPA), if ai = Zi(p) for every i, i.e.,
I∑
i=1
Zi(p) = (0, 0, ..., 0). (5.4.8)
In remainder of this chapter, we impose the following assumptions.
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Assumption 5.4.8. The acceptance setAi is weak-*closed and strictly convex
with respect to B, for all i = 1, 2, ..., I.
Assumption 5.4.9. There is no δ ∈ RI \ {0} for which EQ[δ ·B] is constant
function of Q ∈M.
Remark 5.4.10. Assumption 5.4.9 implies, in particular, that for every i =
1, 2, ..., I, there is no δ ∈ Rn \ {0} such that δ · B ∈ X∞i . This means that
there is no δ ∈ Rn \ {0} such δ ·B ∈ Ri.
Remark 5.4.11. If Assumptions 5.4.8 and 5.4.9 hold true and the agents are
in Pareto optimal condition (i.e., Q(0)i = Q
(0)
j , ∀i, j), then the only PEPA is of
the form (p,0). To show this, we assume that there exists an a ∈ F\{0} such
that (p,a) is a PEPA. Then, ρi(ai ·B) +ai ·p ≤ 0 for all i. Therefore, by the
strict convexity of the risk measures for at least two agents the inequality is
strict. This implies that
∑I
i=1 ρi(ai ·B) < 0, which contradicts the assumption
of Pareto optimality. In other words, the notion of the PEPA is meaningful
only when the probability measures that minimize the penalty functions are
not the same for all the agents.
Theorem 5.4.12. For a vector of claims B ∈ (L∞)n satisfying Assumption
5.4.9 and under Assumptions 5.3.5 and 5.4.8, there exists a unique PEPA
(pˆ, aˆ) ∈ ⋂Ii=1 Pi(B)× F.
Proof. We first define the strictly convex function f : R(I−1)×n → R by
f(a) = ρ1(a1 ·B) + ρ2(a2 ·B) + ...+ ρI−1(aI−1 ·B) + ρI((−
I−1∑
i=1
ai) ·B).
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If for some a˜ ∈ R(I−1)×n, we have that ∇f(a˜) = 0, then a˜ is the unique
minimizer of f , for which ∇ρi(a˜i · B) = ∇ρI(−
(∑I−1
i=1 a˜i
)
· B), for every
i = 1, 2, ..., I − 1, where a˜i denotes the vector (a˜i,k)k=1,2,...,n. The latter means
that
EQ
(a˜i·B)
i [B] = EQ
(−(∑I−1
i=1
a˜i)·B)
I [B],
for every i = 1, 2, ..., I − 1. Then, for the price pˆ = EQ(a˜i·B)i [B], we have that
Zi(pˆ) = a˜i for every i = 1, 2, ..., I − 1 and ZI(pˆ) = −
∑I−1
i=1 a˜i.
In other words, if we denote by aˆ the allocation whose rows are given
by aˆi = a˜i, for i = 1, 2, ..., I−1 and aˆI = −
∑I−1
i=1 a˜i, the pair (pˆ, aˆ) is a partial
equilibrium price allocation. In fact, it is the unique one, since, if we assume
the existence of another PEPA (pˇ, aˇ) 6= (pˆ, aˆ), we get that pˇ = EQ(aˇi·B)i [B],
which in turn implies that ∇f(aˇ) = 0. The latter equation contradicts the
uniqueness of the minimizer of the function f .
Hence, it suffices to show that ∇f(a) has a root. Assume that this is
not the case. Then, by the continuity of f , we deduce that for, each m ∈ N,
there exists a(m) ∈ Dm = {a ∈ R(I−1)×n :
∑(I−1)n
k=1 |ak| ≤ m} such that
f(a(m)) ≤ f(a) for all a ∈ Dm. Furthermore, by the strict convexity of f it
follows that ||a(m)||1 = m. This means that, in order to reach a contradiction,
it is enough to establish
lim inf
m→∞
f(a(m))
m
> 0. (5.4.9)
(see e.g. Chapter 1 in [16]). Any sequence of N through which the lim inf in
(5.4.9) is achieved admits a further subsequence (mk)k∈N, for which a(mk) 1mk
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converges to some a(0) ∈ R(I−1)×n with ||a(0)||1 = 1 (and in particular a(mk)i
converges to a
(0)
i for every i = 1, 2, ..., I − 1). We consider this subsequence
and, for each i, we have that
lim inf
k→∞
ρi(a
(k)
i ·B)
k
= lim
k→∞
ρ′i(k(a
(0)
i ·B)),
where ρ′i(β(a
(0)
i ·B)) denotes the derivative of the function β 7→ ρi((β(a(0)i ·B)))
for β ∈ R (which exists by Proposition 5.4.4). Indeed, by the convexity and
the Lipschitz continuity of ρi (see discussion after Remark B.0.4),
lim inf
k→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ρi(a(k)i ·B)k − ρ′i(k(a(0)i ·B)
∣∣∣∣∣ = lim infk→∞
∣∣∣∣∣ρi(a(k)i ·B)k − ρi(k(a
(0)
i ·B)
k
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ ||a(k)i − a(0)i ||1||B||(L∞)d → 0.
Thus, it is left to show that
lim
k→∞
(
I−1∑
i=1
ρ′i(k(a
(0)
i ·B))
)
+ ρ′I
(
k(−
I−1∑
i=1
a
(0)
i ·B)
)
> 0.
Taking also Lemma 5.4.3 into account, we have that
lim
k→∞
ρ′i(k(a
(0)
i ·B)) = sup{Pi((−a(0)i ·B))}.
Hence,
lim inf
k→∞
f(a(k))
k
=
I−1∑
i=1
sup
Q∈Mi
{EQ[−a(0)i ·B]}+ sup
Q∈MI
{EQ[(
I−1∑
i=1
a
(0)
i ) ·B]}
≥
I−1∑
i=1
sup
Q∈M
{EQ[−a(0)i ·B]}+ sup
Q∈M
{EQ[(
I−1∑
i=1
a
(0)
i ) ·B]}
≥ sup
Q∈M
{EQ[(−
I−1∑
i=1
a
(0)
i ) ·B]} − infQ∈ME
Q[(−
I−1∑
i=1
a
(0)
i ) ·B] > 0,
where the last strict inequality follows directly from Assumption 5.4.9.
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Remark 5.4.13. By the uniqueness of the minimizer aˆ ∈ F of the function f ,
we get that any agent i who participates in the equilibrium (that is aˆi 6= 0)
enjoys a risk reduction (improvement), i.e, ρi(aˆi ·B − aˆi · pˆ) < 0, where pˆ is
the partial equilibrium price (PEP).
Remark 5.4.14. It follows from Theorem 5.4.12 that the PEPA on a vector of
claims B is of the form (pˆ,0), if and only if EQ
(0)
i [B] = EQ
(0)
j [B] for every
i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., n}. In other words, for every vector of claims B ∈ (L∞)n for
which the hypotheses of Theorem 5.4.12 hold and EQ
(0)
i [B] 6= EQ(0)j [B], for
some i 6= j, there exists an allocation aˆ ∈ F such that aˆ 6= 0 and B ∈ Gaˆ.
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Appendix A
The Dynamic Version of the Indifference Price
In addition to the study of the indifference prices ν(w)(B; γ|E) and
ν(b)(B; γ|E) defined at time t = 0, one can restrict attention to any subinterval
[t, T ] of [0, T ], and consider the filtered probability space (Ω,F, (Fu)u∈[t,T ],P)
and the traded-assets process (Su)u∈[t,T ]. To keep this text self-contained,
we state the definition of the dynamic version of the (conditional) indifference
price, together with some results used in the previous chapters. In Section A.2,
we define the residual risk process of the conditional indifference price valua-
tion and state a characterization of it in the case of continuous filtrations. In
Section A.3, we give a brief discussion on the class of BMO-martingales.
A.1 The Conditional Indifference Price Process
The value function defined in (2.1.3) is the indirect utility of the agent
at time t = 0. In a similar way, one can define the agent’s value function
at any time t ∈ [0, T ]. More precisely, for every claim payoff B ∈ L∞, any
random endowment E ∈ L∞, any risk aversion coefficient γ > 0 and any time
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t ∈ [0, T ] we define the indirect utility process as
uγ(B, t|E) = esssup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
U
(∫ T
t
ϑudSu + E+B
) ∣∣∣Ft]
= esssup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
−γ
(∫ T
t
ϑudSu + E+B
)) ∣∣∣Ft]. (A.1.1)
Similarly as in the static case, the indirect utility process induces an
acceptance set at any time t ∈ [0, T ],
Aγ(E, t) = {B ∈ L∞ : uγ(B, t|E) ≥ uγ(0, t|E)} (A.1.2)
and its strict version
A◦γ(E, t) = {B ∈ L∞ : uγ(B, t|E) > uγ(0, t|E)} . (A.1.3)
Therefore, the (conditional) indifference price of a contingent claim at time t,
ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E) is given by
ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E) = inf
{
p ∈ L0(Ft) : p−B ∈ Aγ(E, t)
}
, (A.1.4)
for any t ∈ [0, T ]. In other words, ν(w)t (B; γ|E) is the minimum amount at
which the agent with risk aversion coefficient γ and random endowment E is
willing to sell at time t a claim with payoff B. Equivalently, we can define
ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E) as the P−a.s. unique solution of the equation
esssup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
− γ(E+ ∫ T
t
ϑu dSu + ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E)−B
))∣∣∣Ft]
= esssup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
− γ(E+ ∫ T
t
ϑu dSu
))∣∣∣Ft]. (A.1.5)
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One can show, using the standard dynamic-programming method (see e.g.,
[62]) that (ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] admits a ca´dla´g modification. The ca´dla´g process
(ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] is called the writer’s conditional indifference price process
for the claim B.
A natural analogue corresponding to the buyer’s side can be introduced
in a similar fashion. Namely, the conditional buyer’s indifference price process
of claim B, (ν
(b)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ], is defined as the ca´dla´g modification of the
P−a.s. unique solution of the equation
esssup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
− γ(E+ ∫ T
t
ϑu dSu − ν(b)t (B; γ|E) +B
))∣∣∣Ft]
= esssup
ϑ∈Θ
E
[
− exp
(
− γ(E+ ∫ T
t
ϑu dSu
))∣∣∣Ft]. (A.1.6)
In other words, ν
(b)
t (B; γ|E) is the maximum amount at which the agent with
risk aversion coefficient γ and random endowment E is willing to buy at time
t a contingent claim with payoff B.
Below, we state some properties of the process (ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ], for
the proof of which we refer the reader to [62] (see also Proposition 2.2.2).
Proposition A.1.1. For fixed E ∈ L∞, γ > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ], the mapping
B 7→ ν(w)t (B; γ|E) satisfies the following properties
1. It is increasing, i.e., for every B,C ∈ L∞ such that B ≤ C, P−a.s.,
then ν
(w)
t (B; γ|E) ≤ ν(w)t (C; γ|E), P−a.s..
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2. It is Ft−convex, i.e., for every B,C ∈ L∞ and λ ∈ L∞(Ft), such that
λ ∈ [0, 1], ν(w)t (λB+(1−λ)C; γ|E) ≤ λν(w)t (B; γ|E)+(1−λ)ν(w)t (C; γ|E),
P−a.s..
3. It is replication-invariant, i.e., for every ϑ ∈ Θ, D ∈ L∞(Ft) and B ∈
L∞, ν(w)t (B +D +
∫ T
t
ϑudSu; γ|E) = ν(w)t (B; γ|E) +D, P−a.s..
4. It is time-consistent, i.e., for all stopping times σ, τ ∈ [0, T ] such that
σ ≤ τ , v(w)σ (B|E; γ) = v(w)σ
(
v
(w)
τ (B|E; γ)|E; γ
)
, P−a.s..
A.2 The Residual Risk Process
Having defined the dynamic versions of the indifference price processes,
(ν
(b)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] and (ν(w)t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ], one can extent the notion of the
residual risk introduced in Section 2.3, to the dynamic setting. More precisely,
the writer’s residual risk process of a claim B ∈ L∞, (R(w)t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] is
defined by
R
(w)
t (B; γ|E) = ν(w)t (B; γ|E)− ν(w)(B; γ|E)−
∫ t
0
ϑ(B|E)u dSu,
(note that R
(w)
T (B; γ|E) = R(w)(B; γ|E)).
We can define the corresponding buyer’s residual risk process by
R
(b)
t (B; γ|E) = R(w)t (−B; γ|E).
It is straightforward that
R
(w)
t (B; γ|E) = R(w)t (B − E; γ)−R(w)t (−E; γ), t ∈ [0, T ], (A.2.1)
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where R
(w)
t (B; γ) stands for R
(w)
t (B; γ|0). It is, also, clear from the discussion
in Section A.1 that the processes (R
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] and (R(b)t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ]
admit ca´dla´g modifications.
It has been shown in [62] (see Theorem 13) that when F is continuous,
the residual risk process admits a representation in terms of a martingale
orthogonal to S. Below, we state the straightforward extension of this result
to the conditional case.
Theorem A.2.1. ([62])
Suppose that the filtration F is continuous, and let the process (R(w)t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ],
defined in (A.2.1). Then, there exists a process (L
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] such that
1. (L
(w)
t (B; γ|E))t∈[0,T ] is a Q(−γE)−martingale in the space BMO(Q(−γE))
2. R
(w)
t (B; γ|E) = L(w)t (B; γ|E)− γ2 〈L(w)(B; γ|E)〉t.
When E ∼ 0, the family {L(w)t (B; γ)}γ>0 (where L(w)t (B; γ) denotes the pro-
cess L
(w)
t (B; γ|0)) admits a limit L(w)t (B; 0), as γ ↘ 0, in BMO(Q(0)) sense.
The process L
(w)
t (B; 0) can be identified as a term in the Kunita-Watanabe
decomposition
Bt = EQ
(0)
[B] +
∫ t
0
ϑˆ
(B)
u dSu + L
(w)
t (B; 0), t ∈ [0, T ], (A.2.2)
of the Q(0)−martingale Bt = EQ(0) [B|Ft], where ϑˆ(B) is an S−integrable pre-
dictable process for which (ϑˆ
(B) ·S) is a Q(0)−square integrable martingale. In
particular, L(w)(B; 0) is strongly orthogonal to any Q(0)−local martingale of
the form (ϑ · S), ϑ ∈ L(S).
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A.3 The BMO Martingales
To facilitate the exposition, we state in this section the definition of
the class of Bounded Mean Oscillation-martingales, usually refereed as BMO-
martingales, which are mentioned in Sections 2.4, 3.4 and A.2. For a detailed
review on this class, we refer the reader to [56].
Consider the probability space (Ω,F,F,Q), where F = (Ft)t∈[0,T ] is a
filtration that satisfies the usual conditions. Let (Mt)t∈[0,T ] be a uniformly
integrable Q−martingale with respect to Ft, with M0 = 0. Then, we define
the norm
‖M‖BMO(Q) = sup
τ
∥∥∥EQ [|MT −Mτ−|∣∣∣Fτ] ∥∥∥∞ (A.3.1)
where the supremum is taken over all stopping times τ and || · ||∞ stands for
the L∞(Ω,F,Q) norm.
Definition A.3.1. A uniformly integrable Q−martingale (Mt)t∈[0,T ], with
M0 = 0, belongs in the BMO(Q) class if ‖M‖BMO(Q) <∞.
For the proof of following theorem, which is used in the proof of Lemma
2.4.4, we refer the reader to [56], page 28.
Theorem A.3.2. For p ∈ R such that 1 < p < ∞, there exists a positive
constant Cp such that for any uniformly integrable Q−martingale (Mt)t∈[0,T ],
‖M‖BMO(Q) ≤ sup
τ
∥∥∥EQ [|MT −Mτ−|p∣∣∣Fτ]1/p ∥∥∥∞ ≤ Cp‖M‖BMO(Q)
where the supremum is taken under all stopping times.
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Appendix B
A Short Survey of Convex Risk Measures
A risk measure is a quantitative way to assess the risk involved in a
financial position. If any investment is described by its discounted net payoff
at the end of a certain time period, a risk measure maps any such position to
the real line with the goal to give an assessment of its riskyness. Clearly, such
a map should satisfy a number of axioms in order to be a “rational” measure
of risk.
The axiomatic definition of such a measure of risk was introduced in [5]
and [6], where the notion of the coherent risk measure (see Remark B.0.4) was
defined for a finite Ω and its characterization, usually called robust represen-
tation, was established. Their results have been generalized for a larger family
of probability models in [28] (see also [27] for a related overview). In [36] (see
also Chapter 4 of [37]), the more general notion of convex risk measures was
introduced and the corresponding robust representation was provided. More
recently, the dynamic versions of risk measures have been developed by many
authors (see among others, [7], [21], [32], [40], [68]) together with discussions
on related issues such as time consistency (see [21] and [57]) and equilibrium
arguments (see [8], [9], [11], [18], [34], [35], [43] and [52]). The concept of a
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risk measure in a financial market setting, discussed in Chapter 5, was first
analyzed in [19] and [36] (see also Section 4.8 in [37]) and, then, extensively
developed for a variety of financial models (see among others [41], [57], [67],
[76]).
In this chapter, we state the axiomatic definition of risk measures to-
gether with some of their main properties used in Chapter 5. In order to be
consistent with the main body of this text, we fix a time horizon and consider
L∞(Ω,F,P) (as usually denoted by L∞) as the set of the investment payoffs.
Similar results as the ones stated below can also be obtained for larger payoff
spaces (see, e.g., [20], [22]).
Definition B.0.3. A mapping ρ : L∞ → R is called a convex risk measure
or convex capital requirement , if it satisfies the following conditions, for every
B,C ∈ L∞:
1. Monotonicity, i.e., if B ≤ C, P−a.s., then ρ(B) ≥ ρ(C).
2. Cash invariance or translation invariance, i.e., for every m ∈ R,
ρ(B +m) = ρ(B)−m.
3. Convexity, i.e., for every λ ∈ [0, 1],
ρ(λB + (1− λ)C) ≤ λρ(B) + (1− λ)ρ(C).
Remark B.0.4. In the case where a convex risk measure is also positively ho-
mogenous, that is for all λ > 0, and B ∈ L∞, ρ(λB) = λρ(B), then ρ is called
a coherent risk measure.
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The axiomatic properties in Definition B.0.3 are the minimal ones that
any map whose aim is to qualify the risk involved in investments should satisfy.
The monotonicity simply reflects the fact that investments with higher payoff
should not increase the risk. Similarly, the convexity states that the diversi-
fication of investment positions results in less or equal risk. The property of
cash invariance, and in particular the fact that ρ(B + ρ(B)) = 0, implies that
ρ(B) is in fact the amount of money which, if added to the payoff B, makes
the risk of the position equal to zero. This property, also, means that ρ(B) is
measured in currency units.
A straightforward consequence of monotonicity and cash invariance
property is that ρ is a Lipschitz continuous function with respect to the es-
sential norm || · ||L∞ . Indeed, for every B,C ∈ L∞, B ≤ C + ||B − C||L∞ and
hence ρ(C)− ρ(B) ≤ ||B − C||L∞ .
The class of financial positions whose risk is non-positive are called
acceptable. In other words, any convex risk measure ρ induces the class Aρ,
defined as
Aρ = {B ∈ L∞ : ρ(B) ≤ 0} . (B.0.1)
Some properties of the acceptance set Aρ, which follows directly from
its definition, are stated below.
Proposition B.0.5. ([36])
Let ρ be a convex risk measure and Aρ be its induced acceptance set. Then the
following statements hold
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1. Aρ is monotone and convex.
2. For any B ∈ L∞, ρ(B) = inf {m ∈ R : m+B ∈ Aρ}.
If in addition ρ is coherent, then Aρ is a cone in L∞.
Remark B.0.6. Proposition B.0.5 (especially its second part) signifies that one
can consider a given non-empty, monotone and convex class A ⊆ L∞ as the set
of agent’s acceptable financial positions and, then, induce the corresponding
risk measure ρA by the formula
ρA(B) = inf {m ∈ R : m+B ∈ A} (B.0.2)
(see also (5.1.4)). As proven in Proposition 4.7 of [37], (B.0.2) holds if we
assume in addition that there exists a constant c, such that c ∈ A and that
for every m ∈ R+ and B ∈ L∞, the set
{λ ∈ [0, 1] : λm+ (1− λ)B ∈ A} is closed in [0, 1].
The dual representation of the convex map ρ is usually called robust
representation and is a way to characterize the class of convex risk measures
in terms of expectations and a penalty function. Below, we state this charac-
terization, which is established in Theorems 4.15 and 4.31 of [37].
Theorem B.0.7. ([36])
Let ρ be a lower semi-continuous (for the weak-*topology) convex risk measure
on L∞. Then ρ admits the following characterization
ρ(B) = sup
Q∈Pa
{
EQ[−B]− α(Q)} (B.0.3)
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for any B ∈ L∞, where Pa denotes the set of all absolutely continuous with
respect to P probability measures in (Ω,F) and α : Pa → R¯ is called penalty
function, given by α(Q) = sup
B∈Aρ
EQ[−B], for any Q ∈ Pa.
Remark B.0.8.
1. The penalty function α defined above is the minimum one, that is, if
there exists another map αˆ : Pa → R¯ for which (B.0.3) holds, then
α(Q) ≤ αˆ(Q), for all Q ∈ Pa.
2. It can, also, been shown that the supremum in (B.0.3) is attained.
3. It follows by formula (B.0.1) that ρ is lower semi-continuous for the
weak-*topology if and only if A is weak-*closed.
Remark B.0.9. Representation (B.0.3) can also be understood as a structural
way to obtain a convex risk measure. Namely, (B.0.3) implies that B ∈ Aρ if
and only if EQ[B] ≥ −α(Q), for all Q ∈ Pa. In other words, for a given penalty
function α, a position is acceptable if the expectation of its payoff under any
probability measure absolutely continuous with respect to P is higher that the
level −α(Q).
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